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INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the Israel-Gaza 2008-09 armed conflict and recently
commenced process at the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Court
will soon face a major challenge with the potential to determine its
degree of judicial independence and overall legitimacy. It may need to
decide whether a Palestinian state exists, either for the purposes of the
Court itself, or perhaps even in general.
The ICC, which currently has 113 member states, has not yet
recognized Palestine as a sovereign state or as a member. Moreover,
although the ICC potentially has the authority to investigate crimes
which fall into its subject-matter jurisdiction, regardless of where they
were committed, it will have to assess its jurisdiction over a non-member
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state, in this case Israel. Despite having signed the Rome Statute that
founded the Court and having expressed "deep sympathy" for the
Court's goals, the state of Israel withdrew its signature in 2002, in
accordance with Article 127 of the Statute.' At any rate, a signature is not
tantamount to accession, and accordingly Israel was never a party.! The
latest highly publicized moves in The Hague come amid mounting
international pressure on Israel and a growing recognition in Israeli
government circles that the country may eventually have to defend itself
against war crimes allegations. Unlike the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals of the second half of the twentieth century, it already appears
that the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court could act in
accordance with the formal requests of the state parties, and with respect
to the availability of the accused individual. The ICC already is said to
have encountered difficulties in reviewing the Prosecutor's exercise of
discretion in a few highly politicized international conflicts.' The recent
Israel-Gaza conflict and present judicial process serve as a prime exam-
ple.
The current debate concerns war crimes allegedly committed during
the recent hostilities between Israel and Palestinian combatants in the
Gaza Strip. The month-long 2008-2009 Israel-Gaza conflict, part of the
ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict,4 began when Israel launched a mili-
tary campaign in the Gaza Strip on December 27, 2008, code named
"Operation Cast Lead." The Operation's stated aim was to stop Hamas
rocket attacks on southern Israel, and it included the targeting of Hamas'
members, police force, and infrastructure International reactions during
the conflict included calls for an immediate ceasefire, as in the United
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 127, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
2. See, e.g., Office of the Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel and
the International Criminal Court, ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRs (June 30, 2002), http://
www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2002/6/Israel and the International Criminal
Court. Israel has refrained from signing the Rome Statute because of its concerns about being
the subject of prosecutions generating from the illegal status of the settlements in the Palestin-
ian territories, which are considered by many to violate the Fourth Geneva Convention. See
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Question of the Violation
of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, Including Palestine, 67, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2001/121 (Mar. 16,2001).
3. INT'L CRIMINAL COURT [ICC], OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR [OTP], THE INTERESTS
OF JUSTICE 1 (2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-
4321-BFO9-73422BB23528/143640/ICCOTPInterestsOfJustice.pdf.
4. See, e.g., ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, THE GAZA WAR: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 5
(2009), available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090202_gaza-war.pdf.
5. Operation Cast Lead: Israel Strikes Back Against Hamas Terror in Gaza, ISR. MIN-
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Nations Security Council Resolution 1860, and general concern about
the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip. Human rights groups and
aid organizations have accused Hamas and Israel of war crimes and
called for independent investigations and lawsuits. The conflict came to
an end on January 18, 2009, after Israel, and subsequently Hamas, an-
nounced unilateral ceasefires.9 On January 21, 2009, Israel completed its
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. 0
In the period between December 27, 2008 and February 13, 2009,
the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) received 326 communications
from individuals and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), notably
from Palestinian groups," repeatedly demanding an investigation of the
events.12 After arguing that the ICC was unable to take the case because
it had no jurisdiction over Israel as a non-signatory to the Court's statute,
Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo apparently changed his mind on
February 2, 2009.'1 This rethinking likely followed a declaration lodged
by the Palestinian National Authority under Article 12(3) of the Rome
Statute, which empowers non-member states to accept the Court's juris-
diction. Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo announced shortly thereafter that
the ICC was exploring ways to prosecute Israeli commanders over al-
leged war crimes in Gaza, this at a time when the Court was presumably
examining the case for Palestinian jurisdiction over alleged crimes com-
mitted in Gaza. 4
6. S.C. Res. 1860, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1860 (Jan. 8, 2009).
7. Nidal al-Mughrabi, Israel and Hamas Under Pressure for Gaza Aid Truce,
REUTERS (Dec. 30, 2008, 6:33 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLS69391620081230.
8. Chris McGreal, Demands Grow for Gaza War Crimes Investigation, THE GUARD-
IAN (Jan. 13, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/13/gaza-israel-war-crimes;
Press Release, B'Tselem, Holding Gilad Shalit as a Hostage is a War Crime (June 25, 2007),
http://www.btselem.org/english/PressReleases/20070625.asp; Israel-Gaza Conflict, (Dec.
2008-Jan. 2009), HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/en/features/israel-gaza (last
visited Oct. 14, 2010).
9. Arie Bell & Karl Penhaul, Hamas, Israel Set Independent Cease-fires, CNN (Jan.
18, 2009, 7:11 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/01/18/israel.gaza/index.html;
Israel 'Wants Rapid Gaza Pullout', BBC (Jan. 19, 2009, 5:38 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/middle east/7836660.stm.
10. Last Israeli Troops 'Leave Gaza', BBC (Jan. 21, 2009, 10:35 AM), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/7841902.stm.
11. Catherine Philp & James Hider, Prosecutor Looks at Ways to Put Israeli Officers on
Trial for Gaza 'War Crimes', THE TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 2 2009, at 32, available at http:/
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middleeast/article5636069.ece.
12. See Press Release, OTP, ICC, Visit of the Palestinian National Authority Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Riad al-Malki, and Minister of Justice, Mr. Ali Khashan, to the Prosecutor
of the ICC (Feb. 13, 2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/4CC08515-
DOBA-454D-A594-446F30289EF2/280869/PNAMFA I 30209.pdf.
13. See Philp & Hider, supra note 11.
14. Id.
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A preliminary examination seems to be a standard procedure. The
OTP has decided to open investigations only in five situations, including
those of the Central African Republic and Darfur; in the cases of
Afghanistan, Colombia, C6te d'Ivoire, Georgia, and Guinea, it is still
conducting preliminary examinations and has not yet decided whether to
open investigations. In other cases, including those of Iraq and Vene-
zuela, it has decided not to open investigations following preliminary
examinations." What makes the Israeli-Palestinian case so unique is the
fact that because Israel is a non-member of the ICC, the Court may need
to expand its reach by advocating statehood on behalf of another non-
member party-the Palestinian entity-as a precondition for assessing
jurisdiction.
I. THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK
There are certain procedural preconditions for the exercise of ICC
jurisdiction. The ICC has been empowered to order investigations on its
own initiative regarding matters falling within its jurisdiction. This
power is enshrined in Article 15 of the Rome Statute, which describes a
four-part procedure. 6 First, the Prosecutor is entitled to proceed proprio
motu (on his own initiative) with a preliminary examination of alleged
crimes on the basis of information received, and he or she may seek ad-
ditional information from a vast array of entities, including NGOs. 7
Second, if the Prosecutor finds that there is reasonable basis to proceed,
he or she submits to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request to authorize an in-
vestigation (without prejudice to any subsequent determinations by the
ICC pertaining to issues of jurisdiction and the admissibility of a case).
Third, if the Pre-Trial Chamber rejects the request, the Prosecutor may
present an amended request based on new facts or evidence. Lastly, if the
request is granted, the Prosecutor commences the proper investigation,
which need not lead to specific accusations.' 9
According to the way in which Article 15 has been drafted, any indi-
vidual or legal entity may petition the OTP and ask to examine particular
incidents. However, the Prosecutor is subject to an important restriction,
namely that the alleged crimes have a nexus with a specific state or
15. ICC Prosecutor Looking Into Guinea Situation, 40 THE MONITOR, May-Oct. 2010,
at 9-10, available at http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/monitor4Oenglish
web.pdf.
16. See Konstantinos D. Magliveras, The Position of the ICC Prosecutor in the Recent
Hostilities in the Gaza Strip, 25 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 209, 211 (2009).
17. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15(2).
18. Id. arts. 15(3)-(4).
19. Id. art. 15(5).
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states, be they parties or non-parties to the Rome Statute. Article 12 of
the Statute provides that the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction with re-
spect to crimes allegedly committed on the territory or by nationals of
states that have either ratified the Statute or accepted ICC jurisdiction.20
The only exception is a Security Council referral, to be discussed below.
With respect to the general Article 12 requirement, even if the Prose-
cutor were to regard Palestine as a state, he would not have the authority
to investigate, because Palestine is not a party to the Rome Statute.
Nonetheless, a Prosecutor's decision that Palestine is a "full-status"
country would signal international acceptance and recognition of the
Palestinian Authority's legal standing. However, Article 12(3) provides
that a non-party state may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, ac-
cept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court on an ad hoc basis.2 COte
d'Ivoire set a precedent as the first non-party state to accept ICC juris-
diction over war crimes allegedly committed on its territory.22 Ote
d'Ivoire signed the Rome Statute but has never ratified it.23 However, on
October 1, 2003, it submitted via a note verbale a declaration dated April
18, 2003, accepting the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court under
Article 12(3) with respect to alleged crimes committed from September
19, 2002.24
As explained above, Article 12 provides that when a state party has
referred a case to the Prosecutor, or when the Prosecutor has initiated an
investigation, "the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of
the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the juris-
diction of the Court" by special declaration: "(a) The State on the
territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was
committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that
vessel or aircraft; [or] (b) The State of which the person accused of the
crime is a national."25 Given that Israel, the state of the accused, is not a
contracting party nor has it consented to the Court's jurisdiction over the
20. Id. arts. 12(1)-(2).
21. Id. art. 12(3).
22. Declaration Accepting the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, CMte
d'Ivoire, Apr. 18, 2003, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/74EEE201-OFED-
4481-95D4-C8071087102C/279844/ICDEENG.pdf; Philp & Hider, supra note 11.
23. ICC, Record of Signatories and Signing Statements (July 17, 1998), http://
treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSGIVolume l/Chapter XVIII/XVIII-10.en.pdf.
24. Declarations Art. 12(3), ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+
the+Court/Registry/Declarations.htm. Another example of the usage of Article 12(3) took
place when the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) entered into such an ad hoc
agreement in April 2004.
25. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(2). Here, additional citizenships may grant
jurisdiction over alleged war crimes committed in Gaza against non-Palestinians or Palestini-
ans holding other citizenships, such as Jordanian citizenship, given that Jordan signed the
Rome Statute.
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matter, and that the Palestinian Authority, even if it were considered a
legitimate representative of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip, is
not a sovereign state, it appears that the conditions of Article 12 are not
met.
Part II discusses the requirement that the alleged crimes have a
nexus with a specific state or states. Part m deals with two possible ways
to circumvent the statehood requirement, namely the Prosecutor's power
to commence investigations proprio motu with respect to crimes within
the jurisdiction of the ICC, and the United Nations Security Council's
prerogative to refer matters to the ICC. Lastly, Part IV discusses two
legal mechanisms that can be used to block prosecution: the complemen-
tarity principle, whereby the ICC Prosecutor defers to national
investigations concerning pending allegations, and the Security Coun-
cil's power to request deferral of investigation or prosecution.
II. PRELIMINARY JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
A. Overview
The Rome Statute established a state-based system. As such, a Pales-
tinian state would need to exist in order for the present proceedings to
continue. This Part will analyze several theoretical and practical argu-
ments made in support of recognizing such a state. A distinct question
may arise concerning a separate Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip. Sev-
eral reservations exist herein, relating both to the underlying theoretical
aspects of state recognition and, in particular, to the declaratory state
recognition criterion involving the ability to govern the Gaza Strip.
Moreover, the question remains whether Palestinian statehood could
be upheld by the OTP, given Israel's possible adherence to the Indispen-
sable Third Party Doctrine, which has been systematically practiced by
the International Court of Justice. The doctrine specifically entails the
inadmissibility of legal processes in the absence of relevant third parties,
when their presence is vital to a substantive legal matter at stake. Israel
may be regarded as holding competing title to the Palestinian territories
in a manner that impacts the latter's claim of sole sovereignty. Under the
doctrine, there arises an additional hypothetical question concerning
possible future ratification of the Rome Statute by Israel. In particular,
there is value, albeit hypothetical, in considering the implications of
Israel's reluctance to join the Statute and the parallel scenario in which
the Palestinian Authority would unilaterally act to join Israel to any ICC
proceeding. All of these considerations will be critically assessed below.
26. See infra Part II.C.
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B. Palestinian (non-)Statehood
1. The Statehood Requirement
The state-based system was clearly preserved within the Rome Stat-
ute. At the outset, the Statute contains many provisions, some complex,
concerning the ICC's jurisdiction. No provision, with a single exception
to be discussed below, transcends the state-based system. Arguably, the
OTP is not supposed to read a non-state jurisdiction rule into the Rome
Statute: ubi lex voluit, dicit; ubi noluit, tacit. In contrast, there are a few
instances in which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) may deal with
non-state entities. In fact, according to the rules of the ICJ, an exception
to the state-based rule is expressly recognized: the General Assembly
may request an advisory opinion from the Court in accordance with Ar-
ticle 65(2) of the ICJ Statute. Such was the case, mutatis mutandis,
surrounding the request for an advisory opinion concerning the construc-
tion of a "separation wall" on Palestinian Territory.28
Moreover, as it is currently configured, the Rome Statute is not open
to ratification by entities other than states recognized by the United Na-
tions.29 Furthermore, rule 44.1 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and
Evidence states that the Registrar, upon request of the Prosecutor, may
inquire of a state that is not "a Party to the Statute" or that "has become a
Party to the Statute" after its entry into force, on a confidential basis, as
to whether it intends to make the declaration provided for in Article
12(3).3o The rule thereby limits the Prosecutor's discretion to states.
On January 22, 2009, the Palestinian National Authority lodged a
declaration recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to acts
committed on the territory of the Palestinian Authority since July 1,
27. Statute of the International Court of Justice (annexed to the Charter of the United
Nations) (June 26, 1945) Art. 65(2), 59 Stat. 1055, reprinted in Charter of the United Nations,
Statutes and Rules of Court and Other Constitutional Documents (Series D, Acts and docu-
ments concerning the organization of the court, no. 1, 2d ed. 1947).
28. See INT'L FED'N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [FIDH] & INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTs, LEGAL
CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF A WALL IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRI-
TORY (REQUEST FOR AN ADVISORY POSITION) (2004), available at http://www.fidh.org/IMG/
pdf/il2302a.pdf.
29. See ICC, Assembly of State Parties [ASP], Report of the Bureau on Ratification and
Implementation of the Rome Statute and on Participation in the Assembly of States, ICC Doc.
ICC-ASP/5/26 (Nov. 17, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/aspdocs/library/
asp/ICC-ASP-5-26_English.pdf; Universal Ratification Campaign, COALITION FOR THE INT'L
CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=urc (a pro-ICC coalition campaigning solely
amongst states).
30. ICC, ASP, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, r. 44(1), ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/l/3
(Sept. 2002).
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2002, without signaling the Gaza Strip in particular." This date is not
arbitrary: the ICC only holds jurisdiction over war crimes and other of-
fenses committed after the Rome Statute came into force on July 1,
2002." Apparently, following this declaration, the ICC may decide that it
indeed has jurisdiction to investigate Israel's actions, based on the Pales-
tinian self-referral, and pursuant to Article 12. Yet despite ambiguity
within the international community about the existence or non-existence
of a state of Palestine, the Registrar accepted the Palestinian request
"[w]ithout prejudice to a judicial determination on the applicability of
article 12, paragraph 3" to the declaration. Palestinian lawyers argue
that the Palestinian Authority should henceforth be allowed to refer the
cases in Gaza on an ad hoc basis.M But is there a Palestinian state, quali-
fied to accept ICC jurisdiction under Article 12(3)?
2. The Case of Palestine: A Critical Appraisal
In a recent pivotal article by John Quigley, the author presents five
seminal arguments affirming the recognition of a Palestinian state. The
first of such arguments is that since 1988 there has been a Palestinian
state, following the Palestinian Declaration of Independence and its wide
recognition by states worldwide." The second argument is that the state-
hood declared by the Palestine National Council in 1988 was not of a
new statehood; rather, it was a declaration of an existing state. The third
argument is that Israel never claimed sovereignty over its occupied Pal-
estinian territories, so its sovereignty is not affected by the existence of a
37Palestinian state. The fourth contention is that Israel itself has recog-
nized the Palestinian state. Recognition is an act undertaken by states, so
if Israel had not regarded Palestine as a state, there would have been no
point in asking for a Palestinian recognition of Israel as a pretext to the
Oslo accords." Lastly, the fifth assertion is that Israel's recognition was
31. Palestinian Nat'l Auth., Ministry of Justice, Office of the Minister, Declaration
Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (Jan. 21, 2009), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/74EEE201-OFED-4481-95D4-C8071087102C/279777/
20090122PalestinianDeclaration2.pdf.
32. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 126.
33. See Letter from Silvana Arbia, Registrar, ICC, to Ali Khashan, Minister of Justice,
Palestinian Nat'l Auth. (Jan. 23, 2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
74EEE201 -OFED-4481-95D4-C8071087102C/279778/20090123404SALASS2.pdf.
34. Philp & Hider, supra notell.
35. John Quigley, The Palestine Declaration to the International Criminal Court: The
Statehood Issue, 35 RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 4 (2009); Francis A. Boyle, Create the State of Pales-
tine!, 7 SCANDINAVIAN J. DEv. ALTERNATIVEs 25, 38 (1988); Francis A. Boyle, The Creation
of the State of Palestine, I EUR. J. INT'L L. 301, 301 (1990).
36. Quigley, supra note 35, at 8.
37. Id. at 5-6.
38. Id. at 7.
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tacit and in compliance with the customary rule whereby state recogni-
tion need not be expressed in a formal document.39
a. The 1988 Palestinian Declaration
The first argument set forth by Quigley is that soon after the Pales-
tinian Declaration of Independence on November 15, 1988, and upon its
wide recognition by the United Nations and states worldwide, a Palestin-
ian state came into existence. 0 The Declaration unequivocally states that
the Palestine National Council: "[I]n the name of God, and in the name
of the Palestinian Arab people, hereby proclaims the establishment of the
State of Palestine on our Palestinian territory with its capital Holy Jeru-
salem (Al-Quds Ash-Sharif)."4' Following the declaration, Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat was invited to
address the U.N. General Assembly, which subsequently adopted Reso-
lution 43/177 "acknowledging the proclamation of the State of Palestine
by the Palestine National Council," and according Palestine an observer-
state status within the U.N.42 The resolution was adopted by a vote of
104 in favor. The United States and Israel opposed, and forty-four other
states abstained.43
There are, however, several counter arguments to be made to the
claim that the Declaration and the General Assembly's responses to it
signaled the recognition of a Palestinian state. First, this claim has a con-
stitutive-state-recognition theoretical structure, and as such it is
unconvincing. Second, the United Nations subsequently acted inconsis-
tently with its alleged recognition of Palestinian statehood. Third, the
constitutive-state-recognition theory is inconsistent in its application to
different Palestinian claims for statehood, and to Palestinian acknowl-
edgment of Palestine's pre-state status. We shall discuss these
counterarguments in turn.
39. Id.
40. Quigley, supra note 35, at 4. But see, e.g., GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO Ac-
CORDS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTs 68 (2000)
(concluding that no Palestinian statehood was upheld at the time of the signing of the Interim
Agreement); James L. Prince, The International Legal Implications of the November 1988
Palestinian Declaration of Statehood, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 681, 688 (1989). For further views
that Palestinian statehood was not achieved during the Oslo Accords, see, e.g., Omar M. Da-
jam, Stalled Between Seasons: The International Legal Status of Palestine During the Interim
Period, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POt'Y 27, 86 (1997) (further arguing that statehood was not
achieved even during the Oslo Accords).
41. PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL: DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1988), re-
printed in THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST
CONFLICT 356 (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 2001).
42. Quigley, supra note 35, at 4 (quoting U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., 82d plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/43/177 (Dec. 15, 1988)).
43. Id.
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First, the constitutive-state-recognition theory is overly subjective
and hence practically insufficient vis-A-vis the Palestinian statehood
case. On the one hand, the Palestinian declaration of statehood was im-
mediately recognized by the Soviet Union and a bulk of Arab League,
Soviet Bloc, non-identifying, and underdeveloped states. Together, over
114 states have recognized the newly proclaimed state of Palestine." On
the other hand, however, the United States and the European Union, and
later the Russian Federation itself-all alongside the United Nations-
established the "Quartet" bloc in support of two-party negotiations
toward Palestinian statehood. By so doing, members of the Quartet have
45either rejected or overridden Palestinian statehood recognition.
More specifically, the United States, noting that the PLO was not a
state, sought to close down the PLO mission at the New York Headquar-
ters of the United Nations upon its unilateral 1988 statehood
declaration." The United States further emphasized in its 1991 letter of
assurances to the Palestinians, on the eve of the peace talks in the Madrid
conference, that it would "accept any outcome agreed by the parties,"4
signaling its position that Palestinian statehood had yet to be established.
In fact, at the time, the United States set a practice of officially avoiding
constraints on the outcome of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process and
the status of Palestinian statehood, among other things, based on the as-
sumption that the outcome must be negotiated.48
Moreover, most European states declined to recognize Palestine after
its 1988 Declaration of Independence.4 Several European states did so
on the grounds that they wanted a more definite indication of Palestine's
positive attitude towards Israel, such as an explicit act of recognition of
44. The Palestinian declaration of statehood was immediately recognized by the Soviet
Union. The United States, however, noting that the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
was not a state, sought to close down the PLO mission at the New York Headquarters of the
United Nations.
45. Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict, U.N. Doc. S/2003/529/Annex (May 7, 2003) (Endorsed by S.C. Res.
1515, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1515 (Nov. 19, 2003)). See also Legal Consequences of the Construc-
tion of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 201
(July 9) (supporting the "Roadmap" approved by the U.N. Security Council).
46. U.S. Informs U.N. It Will Close PLO Mission, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 11, 1988), available
at http://articles.latimes.com/1988-03-ll /news/mn-1412_I..united-states.
47. See CHARLES ENDERLIN, SHATTERED DREAMs: THE FAILURE OF THE PEACE
PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1995-2002, at 108 (Susan Fairfield trans., Other Press 2003).
48. Id. at 108. For example, in a letter from President Clinton to Chairman Arafat in
May 1999, Clinton asks Arafat to "continue to rely on the peace process as the way to fulfill
the aspirations of your people," adding that "negotiations are the only realistic way to fulfill
those aspirations . . . ." Id.
49. John Quigley, Palestine: The Issue of Statehood, in PALESTINE AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw: ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND EcONoMIcs 37, 42 (Sanford R. Silverburg ed., 2002).
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Israel.o Years later, in September 1999, shortly before the commence-
ment of Israeli-Palestinian permanent status negotiations, the European
Union's Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a letter to Chairman Arafat reaf-
firming the European position of not recognizing the 1988 statehood
declaration, referring to "the continuing and unqualified Palestinian right
to self-determination including the option of a state."" Based on the
premise that Palestinian statehood should be achieved in the future
through mutual agreement between the parties to the conflict, the Euro-
pean letter further appealed to the parties "to strive in good faith for a
negotiated solution on the basis of the existing agreements."5 2
Overall, within the Oslo Accords framework, the parties have pro-
duced a series of bilateral agreements grounded in United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. These agreements endorse
the principle of Israel relinquishing land in exchange for peace, inten-
tionally avoiding formal adherence to a notion of pre-existing Palestinian
statehood in the main six accords, namely: (1) the Declaration of Princi-
ples of 1993 (Oslo I); (2) the Gaza-Jericho Agreement of 1994; (3) Oslo
II of 1997; (4) the Hebron Protocol of 1997; (5) the Wye River Memo-
randum of 1998; and (6) the Sharm el-Sheik Memorandum of 1999.13
In 2002, further focusing the negotiation track over Palestinian
statehood, the Quartet members adopted the "Road Map" for peace as a
plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The principles of the plan
were outlined in U.S. President George W. Bush's speech on June 24,
2002. In his speech, President Bush called for a future independent
Palestinian state living side-by-side with Israel in peace.54 In exchange
50. Id.; Quigley, supra note 35, at 5 (translating Maurice Flory, La Naissance d'un Etat
Palestinien, 93 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 385, 401 (quoting Presi-
dent Frangois Mitterand of France: "Many European countries are not ready to recognize a
Palestine state. Others think that between recognition and non-recognition there are significant
degrees; I am among these.")).
51. Berlin European Council, Presidency Conclusions, at 24, E.U. Doc. D/99/1 (Mar.
25, 1999), available at http://ec.europa.eu/regional-policy/sources/docoffic/official/regulation/
pdflberlin-en.pdf.
52. Id.
53. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Isr.-PLO, art.
V(4), Sept. 13 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525 [hereinafter Oslo I]; Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the
Jericho Area, Isr.-P.L.O., art. XXIII(5), May 4 1994, 33 I.L.M. 622 [hereinafter Gaza-Jericho
Agreement]; Israel-Palestinian Liberation Organization Interim Agreement on the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip, Isr.-P.L.0, art. XXXI(6), Sept. 28 1995, 36 I.L.M. 551 [hereinafter Oslo
II]; Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, Isr.- P.L.O., Jan. 17 1997, 36 I.L.M.
650 [hereinafter Hebron Protocol]; Wye River Memorandum, Isr.-P.L.O., § 5, Oct. 23 1998, 37
I.L.M. 1251; The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on the Implementation Timeline of Out-
standing Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status
Negotiations, Isr.- P.L.O., § 10, Sept. 4 1999, 38 I.L.M. 1465 [hereinafter Sharm el-Sheikh
Memorandum].
54. President George W. Bush, Second Road Map for Peace Speech (Jun. 24, 2002),
available at http://middleeast.about.comL/od/documents/a/me070912b.htm.
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for statehood, the Road Map required the Palestinian Authority to make
democratic reforms and abandon the use of violence. The Road Map
was subsequently endorsed by the Quartet.
The Quartet members further entrenched the negotiation model of
Palestinian statehood through the Annapolis Conference, held at the
United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, on November 27,
2007.17 At the conference, a two-state solution was articulated as the mu-
tually agreed outline for addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It
anticipated the recognition of a Palestinian state as the end result of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict."' The objective of the conference was to pro-
duce a substantive document resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
along the lines of President George W. Bush's Road Map for Peace, with
the eventual establishment by the Palestinian Authority of a Palestinian
state in the Palestinian territories.59 According to the plan, shortly there-
after the new state was to be collectively recognized by the Russian
Federation, European Union, and the United Nations.
The second challenge to the claim that the 1988 Palestinian state-
hood declaration caused the establishment of a state is that the present
United Nations position on the matter is inconsistent with its alleged
1988 recognition of Palestinian statehood, particularly with regard to its
Resolution 43/177. Beyond its role as member of the Quartet, the United
Nations was clear on its view that Palestinian statehood had not yet be-
come a reality through its official policy to support a negotiated final
two state solution as of 2000. In particular, twelve years after the 1988
Declaration, in a U.N. resolution entitled "Peaceful settlement of the
question of Palestine," the General Assembly noted "with satisfaction . . .
the commencement of the negotiations on the final settlement."' The
55. Id. ("[W]hen the Palestinian people have new leaders, new institutions and new
security arrangements with their neighbors, the United States of America will support the
creation of a Palestinian state . . . .").
56. See Allison Beth Hodgkins, Beyond Two-States: Alternative Visions of Self-
Detennination for the People of Palestine, 28 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 109, 109-10 (2004).
57. Press Release, Sean McCormack, U.S. Dep't of State, Announcement of Annapolis
Conference (Nov. 20, 2007), available at http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/NEA/State/
95458.pdf.
58. See President George W. Bush, Address at the Annapolis Conference (Nov. 27, 2007),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/1l/27/world/middleeast/27cnd-prexytext.html?
pagewanted=all ("We meet to lay the foundation for the establishment of a new nation, a de-
mocratic Palestinian state that will live side by side with Israel in peace and security.").
59. Id.
60. G.A. Res. 54/42, 13, U.N. Doc. AIRES/54/42 (Jan. 21, 2000), available at http:l
www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r54.htm.
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Resolution further called for the "realization of the inalienable rights of
the Palestinian people, primarily the right to self-determination."
Since then, the U.N. has adhered to the Oslo peace accords, and the
vision of "a peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine."62 The con-
tinuing reservations about the status of Palestine are reflected in the
practices of United Nations organs and parallel international organiza-
tions. Both the 42nd World Health Assembly and the Executive Board of
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) deferred consideration of a Palestinian application for mem-
bership in the World Health Organization and UNESCO respectively.
Furthermore, Switzerland, being the depository of the 1949 Geneva
Convention on the Laws of War and the 1977 Protocols, addressed this
matter in 1989. In a Note of Information, "Switzerland reported that it
had declined to accept a 'communication' from the permanent observer
of Palestine to the United Nations office in Geneva, acceding to the Con-
ventions and Protocols.""
A third response to Quigley's argument regarding the effect of the
Declaration is that recognizing Palestinian statehood as expressed in the
1988 Declaration is problematic in light of two competing Palestinian
claims for statehood from 1948 and 2009. In September 1948, a Pales-
tinian government was established in the Gaza Strip with the support of
the Arab League.6 ' That government called itself the "All-Palestine Gov-
ernment" (APG) and on October 1, 1948, it declared an independent
Palestinian state on the whole of Mandatory Palestine with Jerusalem as
its capital. 6 The head of government was said to be the Jerusalemite
Mufti, then Hajj Amin al Husseini.6 ' The APG was unsuccessful in its
efforts to gain international recognition. Though no Palestinian leadership
61. Id. I 5(a). The resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority (149 votes to
3, with 2 abstentions). Press Release, U.N. General Assembly, Assembly Urges Peaceful Set-
tlement of Palestine Question, Declares Israel's Jurisdiction over Jerusalem Void, U.N. Doc
GA/9674 (Dec. 1, 1999).
62. Id. 1-2.
63. James Crawford, The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too Soon?, I
EUR. J. INT'L L. 307, 311 & n.9 (1990) [hereinafter Crawford, Too Much Too Soon] (citing
U.N. Educ., Scientific and Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Request for the Admission of Palestine
to UNESCO, UNESCO 132 EX/31 (Sept. 29, 1989), and the associated consultation by Pro-
fessor Alain Pelet (Sept. 7, 1989)).
64. Id. at 311 & nn.9-10 (citing Embassy of Switz., Note of Information Sent to States
Parties to the Convention and Protocol (Sept. 13, 1989)).
65. Avi Shlaim, The Rise and Fall of the All-Palestine Government in Gaza, 20 J. PAL-
EST. STUD. 37, 39, 41-42 (2009).
66. Id. at 43 ("[A] declaration of independence ... asserted the right of the Palestinian
people to a ... state with the borders defined as 'Syria and Lebanon in the north, Syria and
Transjordan in the east, and Egypt in the south.' "); Avi PLASCOV, THE PALESTINIAN REFU-
GEES IN JORDAN, 1948-1957, at 8 (1981).
67. Shlaim, supra note 65, at 42.
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has ever cancelled APG's 1948 declaration of independence, most mem-
bers of the United Nations followed the British example in ignoring it."
For example, Jordan refused to recognize the APG and the Palestinian
state.' On September 30, 1948, the rival "First Palestinian Congress,"
also known as the "Amman Congress," pledged allegiance to the Jorda-
nian Hashemite monarch in Amman. It then declared that "Transjordan
and Palestine constituted a single territorial unit," and that no Palestinian
government should be established "until the entire country had been lib-
erated."70 Soon after, Jordan invaded the city of Jerusalem, a de facto
contradiction of any alleged claim for APG's sovereignty over its capital
city.7 ' For several years the puppet APG was governed by the Egyptian
forces occupying the Gaza Strip.72 Egypt merely paid lip-service to this
government's independence, fully controlling it on the ground. 73 The
APG occasionally issued statements from its headquarters in Cairo, but
it was disbanded by the Egyptian President Nasir in 1959.74
At any rate, any declaration of a Palestinian state as of 1948 was im-
plicitly nullified. In 1964, with the establishment of the PLO in East
Jerusalem, the organization officially declared as its political goal the
future establishment of a Palestinian state on the entire territory of the
British Mandate of Palestine west of the Jordan River. In 1974, the Pal-
estinian leadership admitted for the second time that no Palestinian state
existed. In the 12th Palestinian National Congress, the PLO adopted a
resolution calling for, inter alia, the future establishment of a Palestinian
state on "Palestinian Territory" by force, in what is also known as the
1974 Palestinian "Doctrine of Stages."
A second competing declaration of statehood was made in 2009. To
suggest that the PLO had the ability to govern the alleged Palestinian
state as of 1988 is arguably equivalent to arguing that the Palestinian
Al-Qaeda faction in the Gaza Strip has the ability to govern a Palestin-
68. Id. at 44.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. In 1948 there was no separate political Arab "East Jerusalem." See, e.g., Charles
Bryan Baron, The International Legal Status of Jerusalem, 8 TOURO INT'L L. REV. 1, 19
(1998).
72. See, e.g., PLASCOV, supra note 66, at 8; ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE PALESTINIANS 20
(Phillip Matter ed., rev. ed. 2005).
73. PLASCOV, supra note 66, at 8 ("The whole attempt proved to be a farce as it could
only function with the consent of the occupying Egyptian forces.").
74. Shlaim, supra note 65, at 50.
75. PALESTINIAN NATIONAL CHARTER art. 2, available at http://www.science.co.il/
Arab-Israeli-conflict/Palestinian-Covenant.asp.
76. Lt. Col. Jonathan D.H., Understanding the Breakdown of Israeli-Palestinian Nego-
tiations, JERUSALEM VIEWPOINTS (Oct. 1, 2002), http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp486.htm (last
visited Oct. 18, 2010).
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ian-Gazan state declared by its leader, Sheikh Abu Nur al Mukaddasi,
as of August 13, 2009. That declaration called for the establishment of
an Arab Islamic Emirate, in direct confrontation with the present
Hamas government in the Gaza Strip and alleged Palestinian state as of
1988." In short, the comparison among these three Palestinian declara-
tions of statehood suggests the failure of all three to adequately comply
with the declarative state-recognition condition concerning the ability
to effectively govern the disputed territories at all times, as will be dis-
cussed later. At least until the establishment of the Palestinian
Authority in 1993, no declaration was successful in giving rise to
Palestinian statehood.
The Basic Law that served as the temporary Constitution of the Pal-
estinian Authority of 2003 provides that the PLO is the sole and
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and that the future
establishment of a Palestinian state would be under its leadership alone."
Any previous declaration of independence stands in contradiction to this
more recent official Palestinian stance. Thus, the 1988 declaration of
statehood failed to comply with declaratory and constitutive state recog-
nition standards alike, either explicitly or implicitly, through
international and Palestinian practices.
Since 1993, much has changed in the Palestinian territories. The
PLO was replaced by the Palestinian Authority which, since the signing
of the Oslo Accords in that same year, has governed parts of the territo-
ries. Despite the Palestinian Authority's basic control, there were several
periods, most notably following the outbreak of the Second Intifada in
2000, in which Israel maintained military presence in many areas of the
territories for security reasons. 9 Furthermore, the Israeli disengagement
from the Gaza Strip in August 2005 marks a new limited level of author-
ity for the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, as will be discussed below.
b. The Pre-1988 Palestinian State
Quigley's second argument is that the statehood declared by the
Palestine National Council in 1988 was not of a new state, but rather was a
declaration of already existing statehood. This claim also may be found in
77. See, e.g., Ali Wakaed, Hamas Hikhri'a et Ha'emut Berafiah; 16 Harugim, YNET
(ISR.) (Aug. 15, 2009), http://www.ynet.co.illarticles/O,7340,L-3762001,00.html.
78. For the latest annotated version of the Palestinian Constitution, see NATHAN J.
BROWN, THE THIRD DRAFT CONSTITUTION FOR A PALESTINIAN STATE: TRANSLATION AND
COMMENTARY (2003), available at http://www.pcpsr.org/domestic/2003/nbrowne.pdf. For a
constitutional document published together with the Palestinian Constitution, see The Decla-
ration of the Establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, in Guy BECHOR, THE
PLO LEXICON 37-40 (1991).
79. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, The Status of the Palestinian Authority, in THE ARAB-
ISRAELI ACCORDS: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 47 (Eugene Cotran & Chibli Mallat eds., 1996).
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the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 2004 concerning the "Separation Wall,"
stating that Palestinians are entitled to self-determination because self-
determination has been a central part of aspirations within international
law since the demise of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of World War I.
As the Ottoman Empire lost sovereignty, a Palestinian state presumably
emerged.80
This argument, too, should be rejected. As explained above, the
United Nations has since abandoned its earlier constitutive recognition
of the state of Palestine. Moreover, there exist serious doubts as to the
U.N.'s initial power to endorse Palestinian statehood before 1988. The
first of such doubts "involves the 'provisional recognition' given to the
sovereignty of the nations subject to 'A' Class mandates pursuant to Arti-
cle 22 of the League of Nations Covenant," as in the case of the Mandate
over Palestine. Provisional recognition of peoples was preserved by
Article 80 of the United Nations Charter.8 2 However, with the exception
of Iraq, "provisional recognition" by Article 22 did not amount to recog-
nition of statehood." In practice, the Class "A" mandates were subject to
the ordinary mandatory regime, and it was never claimed that the status
of the territories concerned was that of independent states. Crawford ex-
plains that "certain 'peoples' or 'nations' were recognized by Article 22
as having rights of a relatively immediate kind, but these rights did not
as yet amount to statehood."84
Additionally, these rights originated in the global political and legal
settlement conceived during World War I and executed in the post-war
years (1919-1923). Insofar as the preceding Ottoman Empire was con-
cerned, the settlement embraced the claims of the Zionist Organization,
the Arab National movement, the Kurds, and the Armenians." At this
time the term "Palestine" did not have an Arab connotation at all. In fact,
the Palestine Foundation Fund (Keren Ha'Yesod), the Palestine Work-
ers' Fund,8 the American League for a Free Palestine," the American
80. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 165 (July 9).
81. Crawford, Too Much Too Soon, supra note 63, at 311-12.
82. Id. See also JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
436 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES].
83. Crawford, Too Much Too Soon, supra note 63, at 337-40.
84. Id. at 312.
85. Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, the American Ambassador to the Ottoman Sultan
from 1913 to 1917, further proposed that the Ottoman Empire be converted into a federation
that included Arabia, Armenia, Cyprus, Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria,
and Turkey. See Paul D. Carrington, Could and Should America Have Made an Ottoman Re-
public in 1919?, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1071, 1082 (2008).
86. PALESTINE FOUNDATION FUND, THE KEREN HA-YESOD BOOK: COLONISATION
PROBLEMS OF THE ERETZ-ISRAEL (PALESTINE) FOUNDATION FUND 5 (1921).
87. GERHARD MONZNER, LABOR ENTERPRISE IN PALESTINE 80 (1947).
88. See PALESTINE STATEHOOD COMMITTEE RECORDS, 1939-1949 (2000), introduction
available at http://www.gale.cengage.com/pdf/scguides/palestine/palstateintro.pdf.
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Friends of a Jewish Palestine," the Palestine Economic Corporation," the
Palestine Electric Wire Company," and the Palestinian Water Company,92
were all Jewish organizations that existed in Mandatory Palestine." Also,
Jews constituted the majority of the population of Jerusalem in the 1860s
against the backdrop of a flagging Ottoman Empire.94
The League of Nations handed Palestine to Great Britain to govern
as a League mandate. Therefore, it was Britain that "picked up" the legal
problems that this mandate would generate. Faced with the apparent con-
tradictions between the McMahon Agreement and the Balfour
Declaration, the British inherited an area that both Palestinians and Jews
believed to be theirs following seemingly bona fide British promises to
both parties. The McMahon-Hussein Agreement of October 1915 was
understood by Palestinians as a British guarantee that, after the World
War, land previously held by the Ottomans would be returned to Arabs
who lived in that land. However, Palestine was not mentioned by name
in this exchange. The Arabs claimed that it had been included in the
promise of an independent Arab state. The British denied this, as evi-
denced by McMahon's letter published in the London Times in 1937.9'
Be that as it may, the McMahon-Hussein Agreement would greatly com-
plicate Middle Eastern legal history. It seemed to directly conflict with
the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which expressed support for "the estab-
lishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."98
89. Id.
90. PALESTINE ECONOMIC CORPORATION RECORDS (PEC), 1921-1944, at 3 (Brenda
Hearing ed., 1993), available at http://legacy.www.nypl.org/research/chss/spe/rbk/faids/
pec.pdf. See also Palestine Economic Corporation, Jewish Virtual Library, http://
www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/ jsource/judaicalejud_0002_0015_0_15345.html.
91. PEC RECORDS, supra note 90, at 45.
92. Id. at 46.
93. See generally PALESTINE STATEHOOD COMMITTEE RECORDS, supra note 88; PEC
RECORDS, supra note 90.
94. See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, The Arab-Israeli Conflict from the Perspective of Interna-
tional Law, 43 U.N.B.L.J. 301, 302 (1994).
95. See Letter from Sir Henry McMahon to Hussein Ibn Ali (Oct. 24, 1915), reprinted
in THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER, supra note 41, at 11-12 [hereinafter McMahon Letter]; see also
Arnold Toynbee & Isaiah Friedman, The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence: Comments and
a Reply, 5 J. CONTEMP. HISTORY 185, 187 (1970).
96. The disagreement noticeably was found in Article I of the letter: "(1) Subject to ...
modifications [as previously set forth], Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the
independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of
Mecca." McMahon Letter, supra note 95, at 11. Toynbee and Friedman explain that Britain
assured the Arabs only territories "in which she [sic] can act without detriment to the interests
of her ally France." Toynbee & Friedman, supra note 95, at 192.
97. See McMahon Letter, supra note 95.
98. Letter from Lord Arthur James Balfour to Lord Rothschild (Nov. 2, 1917), re-
printed in THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER, supra note 41, at 16 [hereinafter The Balfour
Declaration]. Friedman adds that similar to the British Balfour Declaration, there was also a
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The 1920 San Remo Conference assigned the Mandate to Britain
with reference to the Balfour Declaration.' The Treaty of S6vres of 1920
similarly provided that the Mandatory Power would be responsible for
implementing the Balfour Declaration.'" The San Remo Resolution on
Palestine and the Treaty of S6vres, thus, effectively incorporated the Bal-
four Declaration into Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant.
Additionally, Professor Alan Dershowitz claims that "[a] de facto Jewish
homeland already existed in parts of Palestine, and its recognition by the
Balfour Declaration became binding international law when the League
of Nations adopted it as part of its mandate."o' Lastly, the Mandate is
relevant to the discussion of the U.N.'s authority pre-1988 to recognize a
Palestinian state because Article 80 of the United Nations Charter speci-
fies that it does not alter the pre-existing rights "of any states or any
peoples" under mandatory agreements or other existing international
agreements.102
The second problem with the United Nations' initial legitimacy to
endorse Palestinian statehood prior to 1988 arises from the deliberate
lack of a binding rule of succession between the League of Nations and
the United Nations.03 Thus, even if it is argued that the League of Na-
tions was bound by an Arab Palestinian state on the former Mandate of
Palestine, the United Nations would not be bounded by it consecutively.
To be sure, the ICJ in 1950 in the Status of South West Opinion,'0 and
again in 1971 in the Namibia Opinion,os supported the exercise by the
United Nations of authority with respect to mandates on the basis of ar-
guments that did not depend on a rule of succession in relation to the
League of Nations.
French guarantee to the Zionists in June 1917 and February 1918, as well as by the Italian
Government. Toynbee & Friedman, supra note 95, at 200.
99. The British Mandate, reprinted in THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER, supra note 41, at 30
("Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be respon-
sible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the
Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the estab-
lishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.").
100. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey art. 95, Aug.
10, 1920, in 2 THE TREATIES OF PEACE: 1919-1923, at 787 (1924). Three years later, Turkey
formally ceded control over the area of Palestine to Great Britain in the Treaty of Lausanne.
See Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers and Turkey, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11.
101. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE CASE FOR ISRAEL 33 (2003).
102. U.N. Charter art. 80, para. 1.
103. Crawford, Too Much Too Soon, supra note 63, at 312.
104. International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 128 (July
11).
105. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Na-
mibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21).
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A third reservation regarding the U.N.'s initial legitimacy in endors-
ing Palestinian statehood prior to 1988 arises from the mere declaratory
power of the United Nations practiced vis-A-vis the establishment of
sovereignty of a state over a mandatory territory. For instance, although
the General Assembly noticeably acquired power "to revoke the mandate
for South West Africa, that power was not of a general discretionary or
governing kind, but ... a declaratory power exercised on behalf of the
international community in a situation where no state had sovereignty
over the territory concerned" (as in the case of Mandatory Palestine).16
As Crawford observes, "[t]he binding character of [the GA's] decision
[re South West Africa], and in particular the legal consequences for
states as set out in the Namibia Opinion, were in a substantial part due to
the operation of Security Council resolutions pursuant to Article 25 of
the Charter."
107
To conclude, an analysis of the United Nation's authority indeed
bears important implications on the status of Palestine prior to the 1988
statehood declaration. As has been argued thus far, the proposition that
the General Assembly recognized the statehood of Palestine prior to
1988 appears to fail.
c. Contradicting Title by a Relevant Party
The third argument set forth by Professor Quigley is that Israel has
been in control of Gaza and the West Bank as a belligerent occupier
since 1967, but has never claimed sovereignty. A rule of international
law is that the occupier does not acquire sovereign rights in the occupied
territory, but instead exercises a temporary right of administration on a
trustee basis.'o Furthermore, according to the Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States, "[a]n entity does not necessarily
cease to be a state even if all of its territory has been occupied by a for-
eign power or if it has otherwise lost control of its territory
temporarily."'" Accordingly, when territory is taken via belligerent occu-
pation, sovereignty is not affected."o
The seminal work of Professor James Crawford provides an illumi-
native response. He, like others, suggests focusing on the notion of state
106. Crawford, Too Much Too Soon, supra note 63, at 312.
107. Id.
108. GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY . . . A COMMEN-
TARY ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 31 (1957); CRAWFORD,
CREATION OF STATES, supra note 82, at 73.
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 201 cmt. b (1987).
110. See CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES, supra note 82, at 73.
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independence, or sovereignty, as a prerequisite for statehood."' Inde-
pendence, as Crawford explains, should in essence remain the central
criterion for statehood." 2 Such a focus, he proffers, should come in place
of the four individual criteria for statehood listed in the Montevideo
Convention."' To qualify as a state, a political entity must have a legal
order that is distinct from other states and the capacity to act as it wishes
within the limits of international law, without direct or indirect subordi-
nation to the will of another state or a group of states." 4 Formal
independence or separateness exists "where the powers of government
... are vested exclusively in one or more separate authorities of the pur-
ported State either as a result of its national law ... or as a result of a
grant of sovereignty by a former sovereign.""'
Crawford's theory further requires that state independence embody
two indispensable elements. The first element, which is presently re-
solved through the existence of the Palestinian Authority, is the existence
of an organized community on a particular territory, exercising self-
governing power, either exclusively or substantially."' Indeed, the West
Bank and Gaza Strip are territorially distinct from the state of Israel and
are governed by a separate legal order."'
The second element is the nonexistence of exercise of power by an
alternative state-or even the absence of a right, vested in another state,
to actualize such governing power."' Crawford's latter condition for state
independence leads to much stated controversy concerning Israel's sov-
ereignty claim over practically most of the land and key areas in the
West Bank with reference to its borders, airspace, and underground wa-
111. See, e.g., L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 114-15 (H. Lauter-
pacht ed., 6th ed. 1947) (explaining that the four preconditions of statehood are: a people, a
country in which the people has settled, a government, and sovereignty, which "is [a] supreme
authority ... independent of any other earthly authority"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS § 201 n.5 (1987) ("Some writers add independence to the criteria required for
statehood. Compare the Austro-German Customs Union case ... in which the Court advised
that a proposed customs union violated Austria's obligation under the Treaty of St. Germain to
retain its independence.").
112. CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES, supra note 82, at 437. On the criterion of inde-
pendence, see Island of Palmas Arbitration (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (1928)
(statement by Judge Huber); see also Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 402 F.3d
274, 288 (1st Cir. 2005).
113. Crawford, Too Much Too Soon, supra note 63, at 309.
114. DAVID RAld, STATEHOOD AND THE LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 75 (2002).
115. Id. at76.
116. Crawford, Too Much Too Soon, supra note 63, at 309; see also, Benvenisti, supra
note 79, at 62-63 (arguing that the Palestinian Authority has international responsibility de-
spite not representing a state).
117. Palestinian residents of these territories are not represented in the Israeli Govern-
ment, they are subject to separate laws and a separate judicial system, and they may not claim
the legal rights guaranteed to residents of Israel.
118. CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES, supra note 82, at 66.
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ter resources. Israel's contested sovereignty over these areas relates more
specifically to: all settlement blocs; extensive Israeli nationalized allot-
ments; private Palestinian land debatably purchased by Jews or Israelis;
the entire Jordan valley; Jerusalem and its old City; the border with Jor-
dan; all of the vast underground and mountain aquiferial water resources;
military and civil control over the airspace; and, all of the West Bank
border controls."9
Moreover, characterizations of these and other Palestinian Occupied
Territories have changed over time. The term "occupied territories" itself
originally derived from Security Council Resolution 242 (1967).'20
Among other things, this Resolution "Affirm[ed] that the fulfillment of
Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace
in the Middle East which should include the ... [w]ithdrawal of Israeli
armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." 2' Upon its
adoption, Resolution 242 failed to achieve consensus about whether Is-
rael could maintain title over some of the West Bank. According to one
of the American participants in the negotiations over this resolution,
United States policy was based on the conviction, articulated explicitly
by President Johnson on June 19, 1967, that Israel should not have to
return to the exact boundaries of June 5, 1967 because to do so would
not be "a prescription for peace ... but for a renewal of hostilities," and
that there had to be real peace among the parties prior to any with-
drawal.' In contrast, Nabil Elaraby, former member of Egypt's U.N.
delegation, Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations,
and a Judge in the ICJ, argued that, as a matter of law, Resolution 242
required Israel to withdraw from all territories occupied in 1967.23
In short, Resolution 242 did not state whose territory was occupied,
even though it is clear that the occupation of territory did occur. Nor did
119. Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Ar-
rangements, art. IV, Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1542. See also Israeli-Palestinian Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Isr.-Palestine, art. XVU, Sept. 28, 1995, 36
I.L.M. 551, 564 (1997) ("In accordance with the [Declaration of Principles], the jurisdiction of
the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory as a single territorial unit, except
for: (a) issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settle-
ments, specified military locations, Palestinian refugees, borders, foreign relations and Israelis
... ."); Haim Gvirtzman, Maps of Israeli Interests in Judea and Samaria
Determining the Extent of the Additional Withdrawals, BEGIN-SADAT CENTER FOR STRATEGIC
STUDIEs (1997), http://www.biu.ac.il/Besalbooks/maps.htm.
120. S.C. Res. 242, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967).
121. Id. I 1.
122. See Eugene Rostow, The Intent of UNSC Resolution 242-The View of Non-Regional
Actors, in UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242: THE BUILDING BLOCK OF PEACEMAKING
5, 15 (1993).
123. Nabil Elaraby, Legal Interpretations of UNSC 242, in UN SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 242, supra note 122, at 35, 35-44.
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the resolution specify the boundaries of Israel or endorse the 1949 Armi-
stice Demarcation Lines as permanent borders. Furthermore, the ICJ's
Advisory Opinion of 2004 concerning the Wall in the Occupied Palestin-
ian Territory provided no answer to these two questions.124 Given the
above, there seem to be high expectations within Israeli negotiation
teams that portions of the occupied territories in the West Bank will be
ceded to Israel.'5
Furthermore, an argument supporting Israel's claim to parts of the
territories occupied in 1967 might call for a proper interpretation of Arti-
cle 52 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The
Article states that "[a] treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured
by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international
law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations."'2 6 The question,
then, is whether it should be inferred that a peace treaty ceding territory
from the vanquished to the victorious state is invalid. It is possible that,
in the words of the Preamble to Resolution 242, "the acquisition of terri-
tory by war" is inadmissible.127 But, as Yoram Dinstein notes, such an
inference seems erroneous. Under Article 52:
only a treaty induced by an unlawful use of force is invalidated.
There is nothing wrong in a peace treaty providing for the acqui-
sition of territory by the victim of aggression, if the latter [in this
case Israel] emerges victorious from the war. Only the aggressor
State is barred from reaping the fruits of its aggression.1 2 "
Article 75 of the Vienna Convention clarifies that the Convention's
provisions "are without prejudice to any obligation in relation to a treaty
which may arise for an aggressor State" as an end result of its belliger-
ence.'29 This concept also explained the demarcation of the post-Second
World War boundaries of Europe, upon substantial loss of territory by
former Nazi Germany. Equally relevant is the conclusion that, as Jordan
was the aggressor state in June 1967, any border rectifications construc-
tive to Israel based on a peace treaty would be valid under contemporary
124. See generally Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).
125. Netanyahu: West Bank Areas to be Kept, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Jan. 25, 2010,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jan/25/netanyahu-says-some-west-bank-areas-
to-be-kept/.
126. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 52, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/
1 1_1969.pdf.
127. S.C. Res. 242, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967); see also Dinstein, supra note
94, at 316-17.
128. Dinstein, supra note 94, at 317.
129. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 126, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 350.
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international law.3 o In short, it is the illegality of the use of force which
invalidates treaties whereby territories are ceded from one country to
another.
Neither the PLO nor the Palestinian Authority established a defined
territory for the future Palestinian state, since its borders were one of the
permanent status issues left unresolved by Oslo I."' Oslo II also consid-
ered the borders of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as an unresolved
permanent status issue, with Israel retaining control of external bor-
ders.3 2 With respect to the pivotal question of Jerusalem, and who is
entitled to territorial sovereignty thereof, Professor Geoffrey Watson
notes that the dispute may be difficult to resolve from a practical point of
view.'33 Thus, any legal discussion of the competing claims may be futile,
and the only way out of this impasse is a negotiated compromise.
d. Recognition by the Relevant Party
Quigley's fourth assertion is that recognition is an act executed by
states:' 3 "If Israel did not regard Palestine as a state, there would have
been no point in asking for [Palestinian] recognition [of Israel in the
Oslo Accords]. Israel was clearly dealing with Palestine as a state."' 6 In
reply it should be stated that in the absence of a particular rule, the con-
stitutive state recognition theory embedded into Quigley's reasoning
leads inevitably to the proposition that a state is not bound to treat an-
other entity as a state if it has not recognized it. Under the constitutive
theory of statehood, a political entity becomes a state, endowed with le-
gal personality in international law, only when it is recognized as such
by existing states.'37 Put literally, the act of recognition is constitutive of
statehood.'18 For example, Oppenheim opined that "[a] State is, and be-
comes, an International Person through recognition only and
exclusively." 39
130. Jordan formally admits to have been the aggressor in the 1967 war; "[iun response
to the Israeli attack [on Egypt], Jordanian forces launched an offensive into Israel ..... http://
www.mefacts.com/cache/html/jordan/10364.htm.
131. Id.; Oslo I, supra note 53, 32 I.L.M. at 1529.
132. Oslo II, supra note 53, 36 I.L.M. at 562.
133. WATSON, supra note 40, at 267-68.
134. Id. at 268.
135. See Quigley, supra note 35, at 7.
136. Id.
137. Rml, supra note 114, at 28-3 1; MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAw 445-46
(6th ed. 2008); Kathryn M. McKinney, Comment, The Legal Effects of the Israeli-PLO Decla-
ration of Principles: Steps Toward Statehood for Palestine, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 93, 95
(1994).
138. Dajani, supra note 40, at 80.
139. OPPENHEIM, supra note 111, at 121.
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The crucial actors in the present case are the United States and
Israel, both of which strongly object to recognizing Palestine as a state.
Moreover, the argument that Israel implicitly recognized Palestine
through the bilateral agreements runs counter to contractual undertakings
of both the Palestinians and the Israelis, endorsed by the Quartet mem-
bers, whereby the establishment of a Palestinian state should be the
outcome of mutual agreement.'" First, the Declaration of Principles on
Interim Self-Governing Arrangements (Oslo I) leaves little doubt about
the approach of the parties regarding unilateral or external annunciation
of any legal results. As declared already in its Preamble, the agreement
set the parties on a path toward peace and reconciliation "through the
agreed political process," and not in the course of a legal process im-
pressed by third parties. 14 This agreement seems to supersede any
theories of prior recognition by Israel or the validity of external recogni-
tion by other states.
Second, it was agreed that negotiations for the interim period pre-
ceding a permanent settlement would not prejudice final status
negotiations.142 The September 28, 1995 Interim Agreement (Oslo II)
states, "[n]either side shall initiate or take any step that will change the
status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the
permanent status negotiations." 43 According to the Israel Government
Press Office, a hypothetical unilateral declaration of statehood by the
Palestinian Authority would contravene the Oslo Accords and the Wye
River Memorandum. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement of
October 23, 1998, considering the Wye River Memorandum, provides:
"The two sides have undertaken to refrain from unilateral steps that
would alter the status of the area, until the permanent status negotiations
will have been completed."'"
Third, it has been agreed between the parties that "disputes arising
out of the application or interpretation" of the agreements were to be
resolved through negotiations between the parties, and even more spe-
cifically, through a "mechanism of conciliation" to be mutually agreed
140. Crawford, Too Much Too Soon, supra note 63, at 309 ("[T]here are compelling
reasons for rejecting the constitutive theory, and most modem authorities do so.").
141. See Oslo I, supra note 53, 32 I.L.M. at 1527.
142. See Oslo II, supra note 53, 36 I.L.M. at 568; Wye River Memorandum, supra note
53, 37 I.L.M. at 1255; Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, supra note 53, 38 I.L.M. at 1468.
143. See Oslo II, supra note 53, 32 I.L.M. at 568.
144. Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Wye River Memorandum: Background and Main




upon, including binding arbitration. 145 Because the Oslo Accords com-
mitted both sides to settling the dispute through negotiations, and
forbade them from taking steps that would prejudice these negotiations,
it is peculiar that the ICJ Opinion did not mention the agreements in its
decision regarding the security barrier.'4
Finally, Israel has never officially recognized a Palestinian state, and
such recognition was not implied in Israel's acceptance of the Partition
Resolution, per the General Assembly Resolution 181(H) of November
29, 1947,147 or in its admittance to the United Nations. Although the per-
tinent pre-state Jewish organization endorsed the Partition Resolution
when it was first adopted, the Resolution was declined by the Arab states
involved-or for that matter by any organized Palestinian leadership of
Mandatory Palestine.'4 1 "Instead, war broke out, leading to a ceasefire."I49
Consequently, Israel was not admitted to the United Nations based on
the Partition Resolution.5 o Moreover, the United Nations Charter makes
no provision for "conditional admission" for new born states, such as
Israel in the 1940s,' 51 so one cannot assert that Israel was admitted to the
U.N. under the condition of its acceptance of the Partition Resolution.
e. Tacit Recognition and Counter-Recognition
Professor Quigley further argues that recognition need not be ex-
pressed in a formal document. If states treat an entity as a state, then they
are tacitly considered to recognize it.'52 This constitutive state recogni-
tion argument, assuming it could be held as binding international law,
can also be argued in reverse. In fact, a careful reading of both informal
and formal Palestinian leadership statements made over the last sixty
years, especially during the Oslo Accords period beginning in the mid
1990s, tells of systematic Palestinian resolve not to declare and establish
a Palestinian state so long as the peace talks with Israel had not culmi-
nated.
145. See Oslo 1, supra note 53, 32 I.L.M. at 1533; Gaza-Jericho Agreement, supra note
53, 33 I.L.M. at 634; Oslo II, supra note 53, 36 I.L.M. at 566.
146. See generally Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9); HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik
Village Council v. Gov't of Israel 58(5) PD 807 [2004] (Isr.), available at http://
elyon 1.court.gov.il/filesseng/04/560/020/a28/04020560.a28.pdf.
147. The Resolution calls for termination of the British Mandate for Palestine, and the
partition of the territory into two independent states: Jewish and Arab. See G.A. Res. 181
(Nov. 29, 1947), available at http://www.yale.edullawweb/avalon/un/res181.htm.
148. Crawford, Too Much Too Soon, supra note 63, at 313.
149. Id.
150. CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES, supra note 82, at 442.
151. Id.
152. John Quigley, supra note 35, at 4.
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The Palestinian narrative of future statehood seemingly underwent a
conceptual overhaul. In the 1940s the Palestinian leadership agreed to a
future Palestinian state with permanent borders within Mandatory
Palestine (including Israeli territory), but this view has shifted in three
directions. All directions disclose that no Palestinian state exists
according to Palestinian formal and informal policy, while occasionally
criss-crossing three different statehood models. The first of these
models calls for the establishment of a future Palestinian state based on
the two-state solution, yet with temporary borders and on the entire
occupied Palestinian territories, based on U.N. Security Council Reso-
lutions 242 and 338, following the Six-Day War of 1967 and the Yom
Kippur War of 1973, respectively.' Currently, the international commu-
nity and the United Nations do not recognize the existence of a
Palestinian state according to this statehood-building model.' 4 This has
been the prevailing model for the longest period of time.
The second statehood model, upheld most noticeably in 2005, bears
witness to the formal Palestinian leadership rejecting the notion of a Pal-
estinian state with temporary borders. As stated by Palestinian Authority
President, Mr. Mahmoud Abbas ("Abu Mazen"): "If it is up to me, I will
reject it . . . it's better for us and for the Israelis to go directly to final
status . . . . I told Mr. Sharon that it's better for both sides to establish
this back channel to deal with final status. . . Simply put, according
to this reasoning the Palestinians then pursued statehood within the two-
state negotiable solution, but with permanent borders.
The third and more recent Palestinian practice admitting the non-
existence of a current Palestinian state calls for a single-state solution,
based on the "two peoples-one state" conception, effectively pursuing
the unification of Palestinian self-determination statehood aspirations
with the state of Israel.'5 6 Be that as it may, all models since the 1940s
jointly acknowledge that Palestinian statehood is to be established pro-
spectively.
Examples of these approaches are manifold. To begin with, in the
heydays of the Oslo peace process, circa 1995, Palestinian Authority
153. See discussion infra.
154. See, e.g., SHAW, supra note 137, at 247.
155. Steven Erlanger, Abbas Declares War with Israel Effectively Over, N.Y TIMES, Feb.
14, 2005, at Al.
156. For a discussion about the single-state solution within Palestinian public opinion,
see Tony Judt, Israel: The Alternative, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Oct. 23, 2003, available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2003/oct/23/israel-the-alterative/; Ahmad Samih
Khalidi, A one-state solution: A unitary Arab-Jewish homeland could bring lasting peace to
the Middle East, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 29, 2003, at 17; Chris McGreal, Intifada Leader Uses
Courtroom to Point to One-State Solution, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 30, 2003, at 17; Michael
Tarazi, Op-Ed., Why Not Two Peoples, One State?, N.Y TIMEs, Oct 3, 2004, at A25.
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Chairman Arafat proclaimed, "We are approaching [the time] to declare
an independent Palestinian state and its capital in noble Jerusalem. I
mean it. I mean it."' In the same year, and arguably in deviation from
the second statehood model, Mr. Sakher Habash, a member of the Cen-
tral Committee of Fatah and one of its founders and recognized chief of
ideology, referred to this matter in a speech made in Arafat's name.'
Referring to the third statehood model, he stated: "Experience teaches us
that without establishing a Palestinian state on the entire land, peace
cannot be achieved . .. . They [the Zionists] must become citizens of the
state of the future, the democratic Palestinian state."'
Quigley himself notes elsewhere that:
In 1997, the cabinet of the Palestinian Authority discussed the
possibility of declaring the establishment of a Palestinian state
with Jerusalem as its capital; Chairman Arafat, asserting that
Palestine statehood was "not an Israeli issue" but "an Arab and
international issue," indicated that the intent was to do so prior
to the final negotiations with Israel on Palestine's status. Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded that a "unilateral
declaration" of a Palestinian state would violate the then recently
signed agreement on Israeli re-deployment from Hebron.
Until 1999, no Palestinian state had been declared or established. On
May 4, 1999, Chairman Arafat was expected to unilaterally declare Pal-
estinian statehood,16' given the approaching deadline for a permanent
settlement without momentous diplomatic progress.' 62 Addressing a rally
in Nablus on November 14, 1998, Arafat said: "[we] will declare our
independent state on 4 May 1999, with Jerusalem as its capital." 63 This
intention was not fulfilled, as Arafat backed down from his previous
statement and instead suggested that he would negotiate for the creation
157. Justus R. Weiner, Peace and Its Discounts: Israeli and Palestinian Intellectuals
Who Reject the Current Peace Process, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 501, 528 (1996).
158. Lt. Col. Jonathan D.H., supra note 76.
159. Id.
160. John Quigley, The Israel-PLO Interim Agreements: Are They Treaties?, 30 COR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 717, 726 (1997) (quoting Arafat's Cabinet Discusses Establishment of State,
REUTERS, Jan. 24, 1997).
161. See Deborah Sontag, Arafat's Tightrope: Palestinian Statehood, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar.
23, 1999, at A3.
162. Id.; see also Ben Lynfield, Erekat: May 4 Will be a Normal Day, JERUSALEM POST,
May 4, 1999, at 1.
163. Nat'1 Unity Coal. for Isr., Arafat Again Calls for Palestinian State, Washington
D.C., Nov. 16, 1998.
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of a state.'6 And thus, the official Palestinian position once again impli-
edly acknowledged that no Palestinian state existed thus far.
May 4, 1999 was the official deadline for a permanent settlement. It
passed silently without the parties derogating from their Oslo obliga-
tions. Successively, four months after the expiration of the deadline, the
parties "commit[ted] themselves to the full and mutual implementation
of the Interim Agreement [Oslo II] and all other agreements concluded
between them since September 1993" in the Sharm El-Sheikh Memo-
randum." So although no settlement was achieved within the timeframe
set by Oslo I, the passage of time did not vitiate the agreements concern-
ing the interim period preceding a permanent settlement.'6 Certainly,
according to the Vienna Convention, parties cannot denunciate or with-
draw from a treaty that does not include a termination provision' 7-that
is, unless it can be established that the parties intended to admit the pos-
sibility of denunciation or withdrawal,'68 or if such likelihood was
implied by the nature of the treaty. 69 Both the text of the Oslo Accords
and the practice of the parties indicate that they intended for the Accords
to remain in effect in the event that a settlement on permanent status is-
sues was not achieved within the required timeframe. 0
Furthering the second two-state statehood model, Arafat declared
that the conflict with Israel could not end without the transfer of East
Jerusalem to Palestinian sovereignty and vowed to declare a Palestinian
state on September 13, 2000 with Jerusalem as its capital. 7 ' Against the
backdrop of Israeli and American-levied pressure, no declaration of such
kind was then made, again tacitly upholding the claim that even accord-
164. See, e.g., Samar Assad, Arafat Moderates Position on Palestinian Statehood, Asso-
CIATED PRESs, May 20, 1998.
165. Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, supra note 53, 38 I.L.M. 1465.
166. Geoffrey R. Watson, The "Wall" Decisions in Legal and Political Context, 99 Am.
J. INT'L. L. 6, 23 (2005).
167. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 126, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 345.
As established in Part m(A)(i), the Vienna Convention is the leading authoritative source of
international treaty law, even for parties who are not signatories to it, such as the Palestinian
Authority.
168. Id. art. 56(b).
169. Id.
170. See Oslo I, supra note 53, 32 I.L.M. at 1527; Oslo II, supra note 53, 36 I.L.M. at
558; Watson, supra note 166, at 23; Seth Benjamin Orkand, Comment, Coming Apart at the
Seamline-the Oslo Accords and Israel's Security Barrier: A Missed Opportunity at the Inter-
national Court of Justice and the Israeli Supreme Court, 10 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 390, 426
(2007).
171. See, e.g., Hatem Lutfi, Arafat: No Peace Without Jerusalem, JERUSALEM TIMES,
July 28, 2000, at I ("Jerusalem is the capital of the state of Palestine and whoever does not
like this may drink from the Gaza Sea.").
100 [Vol. 32:73
Israel, Palestine, and the ICC
ing to the Palestinian leadership no Palestinian state has ever been offi-
cially declared.17 2
Finally, a recent Palestinian implicit acknowledgment that no Pales-
tinian state has yet been declared took place on August 1, 2009. During
the sixth Fatah Congress held in the city of Bethlehem in the West Bank,
the Congressional committee officially declared that the formal policy of
the PLO was that future declaration of a Palestinian state would take
place in the event that peace negotiations with Israel should fail.1
7 3
In conclusion, international legal practice of the last sixty years, par-
ticularly during the Oslo Accords period beginning in the mid-1990s,
demonstrates systematic Palestinian determination not to establish a Pal-
estinian state so long as the peace talks with Israel had not yet
concluded. By the same token, it is arguably the policy of the Palestinian
Authority, in compliance with the constitutive state recognition theory,
that from 1948 to the present day, no Palestinian state has existed.
3. A Gaza-Based Hamas-Governed State
For the purpose of assessing jurisdiction over the Israel-Gaza con-
flict, the ICC could argue that a separate Palestinian state exists in the
Gaza Strip, where the alleged crimes were committed. This claim has not
been made either by the Palestinian Authority or by the Hamas govern-
ment, and raises various difficulties. For starters, it is inconsistent with
the Oslo Accords stance that the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are a sin-
gle territorial unit.174
Moreover, under the constitutive theory of statehood, a political en-
tity becomes a state, endowed with legal personality in international law,
only when it is recognized as such by existing states. No state or impor-
tant international organization has recognized a Hamas-based Palestinian
state in the Gaza Strip. Such status most probably was never acquired by
Hamas following its forcible assumption of power in the Strip in defi-
ance of Palestinian Authority hegemony and of the Oslo peace process at
large. Neither does the international community recognize the Hamas
government, although it was democratically elected. Hence, the Gaza
Strip cannot be deemed an independent state under this theory.
172. See Danna Harman, Clinton Warns Arafat Against Unilateral Statehood, JERUSA-
LEM POST, July 30, 2000, at 1; Arafat Ready to Discuss Statehood, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 22
1999, available in 1999 WL 12932378.
173. See Memorandum from the Fateh 6th Convention (Aug. 10, 2009), available at
http://www.passia.org/aboutus/MahdiPapers/FatehConvenftion.pdf.
174. See Oslo I, Agreed Minutes, supra note 119, 32 I.L.M. at 1542. This was repeated
with further elaboration in Art XVII of Oslo II, which states that "[i]n accordance with [Oslo
I], the jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory as a single
territorial unit." Oslo H, supra note 53, 36 I.L.M. at 564.
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According to the declaratory theory of statehood, however, a certain
entity may be defined as a "state" for the purposes of international law if
it meets certain structural criteria, even if it is not recognized as such by
other states.'75 Recognition, therefore, is only declaratory of an existing
fact. The traditional conditions of independent statehood are stated in the
1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.' 76 Arti-
cle 1 provides that a state as a person of international law must possess
the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined
territory; (c) a government; and (d) the capacity to enter into relations
with other states. Article 3 emphasizes that the political existence of the
state is independent of recognition by other states. This definition was
endorsed, inter alia, by the American Law Institute in the Third Re-
statement of Foreign Relations. 77
Most notably, while the Hamas government exercises some control
over the Gaza Strip, it seems to fall short of the degree of control exer-
cised by an independent government in that some of those powers were
retained by Israel."' With regard to the capacity to engage in foreign re-
lations, the Hamas government is theoretically subject to the Oslo
Accords, whereby its power to engage in foreign relations is limited.
More importantly, the Hamas regime in Gaza is not recognized by most
states, the United States and the European Union in particular, rendering
formal relations with foreign states practically impossible. 79
The Hamas government in Gaza lacks at least formal independence.
If an entity, albeit independent, does not consider itself a state, "there
can be no statehood."so Neither the Palestinian Authority nor the Hamas
government has declared independence so far over Gaza alone. The offi-
cial Palestinian position is that the Gaza Strip is still an occupied
territory."' This view has been consistently articulated by Hamas leaders.
For instance, in a 2007 interview, shortly after the Hamas-Fatah clashes,
Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar stated: "We're fighting for the liberation
175. RAi6, supra note 114, at 32-33; SHAW, supra note 137, at 446; Dajani, supra note
40, at 80-81; McKinney, supra note 137, at 95.
176. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165
L.N.T.S. 19, 25. It is generally agreed that Article I lays down the traditional criteria for state-
hood. RA1, supra note 114, at 24, 49; Dajani, supra note 40, at 81.
177. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 201 (1987).
178. Yuval Shany, Binary Law Meets Complex Reality: The Occupation of Gaza Debate,
41 ISR. L. REv. 68, 77 (2008) [hereinafter Shany, Binary Law].
179. See, e.g., U.N. Chief Expresses Outrage over Israeli Bombing, USA TODAY, Jan. 15,
2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-01-15-israel-un_N.htm ("The
international community does not recognize Hamas' government.").
180. Rml, supra note 114, at 76; See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS § 201 cmt. f (1987) ("While the traditional definition does not formally require it, an
entity is not a state if it does not claim to be a state.").
181. Shany, Binary Lw, supra note 178, at 70-71.
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of our land from an occupation."l82 Zahar restated this position in a 2008
interview. When asked about the analogy between Hamas and Hezbollah
he replied: "Don't make comparisons. Because Hezbollah lives in open
borders, Hezbollah is in an independent state. We are under occupation.
We should have weapons and arms more than Hezbollah, because Hez-
bollah is a liberated land, but we are here in an occupied land."'
Moreover, under the Oslo Accords, neither side was permitted to attempt
to unilaterally alter the status of the West Bank or the Gaza Strip.'" In
short, per the Oslo Accords neither the Palestinian Authority nor the
Hamas government could have proclaimed independence without having
acted in violation of the agreement.'
But is the Gaza Strip at least free of occupation with respect to the
"ability to govern" statehood criterion? Israel occupied the Gaza Strip
during the Six-Day War of June 1967.'" The 1979 peace treaty between
Egypt and Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egyptian control and
established the boundary between the two countries as the recognized
international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory
of Palestine, notably "without prejudice to the issue of the status of the
Gaza Strip."' 7 In May 1994, following the Oslo Accords,'" the Palestin-
ian Authority was given nearly full power of government over most of
the Strip, while Israel retained governmental power over Israeli settle-
ments, main roads, borders, airspace, and territorial waters, and security
authority over the entire area. A decade later, in February 2005, the
Israeli government decided to implement its earlier mentioned unilateral
"disengagement plan."'89 By September 12, 2005, all Israeli settlements
and military bases in the Strip had been dismantled, and all Israeli troops
and settlers had withdrawn. Israel also withdrew from the Philadelphi
Route, a narrow buffer zone along the Gaza-Egyptian border, apparently
to dispel any allegation that the territory was still occupied. The Israeli
182. Interview with Hamas Co-Founder Mahmoud Zahar, SPIEGEL (June 22, 2007),
http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/world/0,1518,490160,00.html.
183. Amira Hass, Top Hamas Leader to Haaretz: U.S. Sanctions to Blame for Gaza
Crisis, HAARETZ, Dec. 14, 2008, available at http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/top-
hamas-leader-to-haaretz-u-s-sanctions-to-blame-for-gaza-crisis-1.259454.
184. Oslo I, supra note 53, 32 I.L.M. at 1537; Oslo II, supra note 53, 36 I.L.M. at 568.
185. Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Israel's Legal Obligations to Gaza After the Pullout, 31
YALE J. INT'L L. 524, 526 (2006) (referring to a Palestinian declaration of independence as a
clear violation of the Oslo Accords).
186. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, Oct.
18, 1907, 187 Consol. T.S. 227 (defining occupation).
187. Treaty of Peace, Egypt-Isr., art. 2, Mar. 26, 1979, 1136 U.N.T.S. 115.
188. Oslo I, supra note 53.
189. Israel's Disengagement Plan: 2005, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, http://
www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel/Israel+in+Maps/Israels+Disengagement+Plan-
+2005.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).
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Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Southern Command issued a decree pro-
claiming the end of military rule in the Strip.'"
In the January 2006 elections, Hamas won 74 out of 132 seats in the
Palestinian Legislative Council. Despite its victory, and following inter-
national pressure, Hamas established a unity government with Fatah.
Nevertheless, tensions between the two parties escalated,"' and clashes
between Hamas and Fatah erupted in January 2007, and again in May
2007. On June 13-14, 2007, Hamas routed Fatah forces in Gaza. Conse-
quently, Palestinian President Abbas dissolved the Hamas government,
declaring his intent to install a new Fatah government.192 The result was
two governments: a Hamas alleged government in Gaza, and a Fatah
government under Abbas' presidency in the West Bank.'93
Despite the disengagement, Israel still possesses certain control over
the Gaza Strip. The IDF controls the movement of people and goods
from Israel into Gaza, and has limited control over the Gaza-Egyptian
border.194 Secondly, the IDF controls the airspace and territorial waters of
the Gaza Strip.'95 In fact, Israel has yet to agree to the opening of Gaza's
airport and seaport.' Thirdly, Israel still controls the Strip's population
registry.'" Fourthly, Israel has a certain amount of control over the taxa-
tion system in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.'" Lastly, even before
the Cast Lead Operation in 2009, the IDF maintained some control over
movement in the Strip through short-term incursions and a "No-Go
Zone."'9
190. Shany, Binary Lw, supra note 178, at 70; Yuval Shany, Faraway, So Close: The
Legal Status of Gaza After Israel's Disengagement, 8 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 369, 369
(2005) [hereinafter Shany, Faraway, So Close].
191. S.C. Res. 1860, 17, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1860 (Jan. 8, 2009) ("[E]ncourage tangible
steps towards intra-Palestinian reconciliation including in support of mediation efforts of
Egypt and the League of Arab States as expressed in the 26 November 2008 resolution, and
consistent with Security Council resolution 1850 (2008) and other relevant resolutions."); S.C.
Res 1850, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1850 (Dec. 16, 2008) (acknowledging the commitment of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization to the two-state solution).
192. Eli Lake, Hamas Takes Over Gaza Security Services, N.Y. SUN, June 15, 2007, at 1,
available at www.nysun.com/article/56622.
193. SHERIFA ZUHUR, HAMAS AND ISRAEL: CONFLICTING STRATEGIES OF GROUP-BASED
POLITICs 38 (2008).
194. See GISHA: LEGAL CTR. FOR FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, DISENGAGED OCCUPIERS:
THE LEGAL STATUS OF GAZA 32 (2007), available at http://www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/
Report for the website.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2010); Stephanopoulos, supra note 185, at
524.
195. GISHA, supra note 194, at 47; Shany, Faraway, So Close, supra note 190, at 373;
Stephanopoulos, supra note 185, at 524.
196. GISHA, supra note 194, at 50, 52; Shany, Faraway, So Close, supra note 190, at
373; Stephanopoulos, supra note 185, at 524.
197. See sources cited supra note 196.
198. GISHA, supra note 194, at 54-55; Stephanopoulos, supra note 185, at 524.
199. GISHA, supra note 194, at 49; Stephanopoulos, supra note 185, at 524.
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Before Israel's withdrawal in September 2005, there was little doubt
that the Gaza Strip was an occupied non-state territory.200 For instance,
the ICJ held in 2004 that the West Bank was "occupied by Israel in
1967," and that "[s]ubsequent events in these territories [including the
implementation of the Oslo Accords] ... have done nothing to alter the
situation. All these ... territories remain occupied territories and Israel
has continued to have the status of occupying Power."20' This statement
applies mutatis mutandis to the Gaza Strip. Arguably, the unilateral dis-
engagement did not lead to the complete end of Gaza's occupation; nor
did it lead to the establishment or recognition of a sovereign Palestinian
state therein, although it should be noted again that a state can be wholly
occupied and yet remain an international actor.
Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which embody rules of
customary international law, provides that a "[t]erritory is considered
occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile ar-
my. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority
has been established and can be exercised."20 The traditional view is that
"[t]he law of occupation is applicable to regions in which foreign forces
are present, and in which they can maintain effective control over the life
of the local population and exercise the authority of the legitimate
power."204 Put differently, occupation presumably entails: (a) actual pres-
ence of hostile troops in the area; (b) the hostile troops' ability to
exercise effective governmental powers in the area;205 and (c) the legiti-
mate government's inability to exercise effective governmental powers.23
Under the traditional view, occupation ends when the foreign troops
leave the occupied territory.207 Thus at first glance the disengagement
200. See GISHA, supra note 194, at 82. But see Shany, Binary Law, supra note 178, at 78
("Already in 1994, following the establishment of Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho,
certain doubts arose pertaining to the continued applicability of the laws of occupation to
areas transferred to Palestinian control.").
201. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 167 (July 9).
202. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 201 cmt. b (1987); CRAW-
FORD, CREATION OF STATES, supra note 82, at 59; VON GLAHN, supra note 108, at 31.
203. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, Oct.
18, 1907, 187 Consol. T.S. 227.
204. Eyal Benvenisti, Responsibility for the Protection of Human Rights Under the In-
terim Israeli-Palestinian Agreements, 28 ISR. L. REv. 297, 308 (1994). See also EYAL
BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 4 (1993) ("[The phenomenon of
occupation] can be defined as effective control of a power ... over a territory to which that
power has no sovereign title, without the volition of the sovereign of that territory.").
205. There is no need, however, for the establishment of an actual military government.
See HCJ 102/82 Tsemel v. Defense Minister PD 37(3) 365, 373 [1983] (Isr.).
206. Shany, Faraway, So Close, supra note 190, at 376.
207. Adam Roberts, The End of Occupation: Iraq 2004, 54 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 27, 28
(2005).
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plan has brought the occupation of the Gaza Strip to an end. This indeed
is the official position of Israel. In an address to the U.N. General As-
sembly, former Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, proclaimed "[t]he
end of Israeli control over and responsibility for the Gaza Strip."208 How-
ever, this position is open to debate for a variety of reasons.
First, as mentioned above, Israel has retained control over the Strip's
airspace and territorial waters, most border crossings, population regis-
try, and tax system. Arguably, effective control does not require actual
military presence on the ground.2m As articulated by the Israeli Human
Rights organization Gisha: "the proper interpretation of Article 42 of the
Hague Conventions is an evolutive interpretation that takes into account
changes in the way control is exercised."2 o While "the source of the oc-
cupying power's authority is military superiority," the ability to exercise
authority, rather than actual physical presence, determines whether a ter-
ritory is occupied.211 Under this view, Israel's control-even after the
disengagement-is sufficient to establish occupation. 212 To date, this in-
terpretation remains the official position of the Palestinian Authority
itself.213 It was also endorsed by John Dugard, the U.N. Special Rappor-
teur for the Occupied Palestinian Territories.2 4 However, this view is
questionable as it is inconsistent with the customary interpretation of
Article 42, requiring physical presence of hostile forces on the ground.
As Shany correctly observes, "[t]his is not mere formalism, as it is hard
to conceive of the manner in which an occupier with no ground presence
could realistically be expected to execute its obligations under jus in bel-
lo (e.g., maintenance of law and order, provision of basic services,
etc.)."215
Second, "it is well established in legal doctrine that an occupier can
exercise effective control over an entire area without maintaining troop
208. U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., 5th plen. mtg. at 46, U.N. Doc. A/60/PV.5 (Sept. 15,
2005).
209. Stephanopoulos, supra note 185, at 525 ("Boots on the ground are often a reason-
able proxy for authority over a territory, but nothing in the Hague Convention makes them a
prerequisite for a finding of occupation.").
210. GISHA, supra note 194, at 69.
211. Id. at 76.
212. Mustafa Mari, The Israeli Disengagement from the Gaza Strip: An End of the
Occupation?, 8 Y.B. INT'L HuM. L. 356, 367-68 (2005).
213. Shany, Binary Law, supra note 178, at 70-71; Robert A. Caplen, Rules of "Disen-
gagement": Relating the Establishment of Palestinian Gaza to Israel's Right to Exercise
Self-Defense as Interpreted by the International Court of Justice at The Hague, 18 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 679, 710 (2006); Mari, supra note 212, at 367-68.
214. John Dugard, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in
the Palestinian Territories Occupied Since 1967,S 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/17 (Jan. 29, 2007).
215. Shany, Faraway, So Close, supra note 190, at 380.
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presence in parts thereof."216 According to the Oslo Accords "[t]he two
sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit,
whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period."217 One may
thereby contend that Israel has only withdrawn its troops from part of the
territory.2 8 Partial withdrawal of forces does not end occupation. This
view appears to be the official stance of neighboring Egypt.2 '9 However,
the Strip constitutes a separate geographical district "effectively cut off'
from the West Bank. In fact, since the Hamas takeover of the Strip in
2007, it also constitutes a separate political entity.2 20 At the very least,
one may aver that the disengagement plan involved complete withdrawal
of Israeli forces from the territory relevant to the matter before the ICC,
namely the Gaza Strip.22'
Third, under the Oslo Accords and subsequent agreements, "neither
side could initiate or take any step changing the status of the West Bank
or the Gaza Strip [pending the outcome of the permanent status negotia-
tions]."222 As explained above, the Strip was occupied before the
disengagement. Arguably, it must still be deemed occupied or else "Is-
rael will have [affected] the unilateral change in status prohibited by the
Israel-PA interim agreements."223 The Palestinians "have not consented to
any alteration of Gaza's legal status."224 A possible reply is that the valid-
ity of the Oslo Accords is in doubt given the multiple violations of
central provisions by both parties and the expiration of the time allocated
for the conclusion of a permanent status agreement.225 An alternative
216. Yuval Shany, The Law Applicable to Non-Occupied Gaza: A Comment on Bas-
siouni v. Prime Minster of Israel 42 ISR. L. REV. 101, 101 (2009) [hereinafter Shany, The Law
Applicable].
217. Oslo I, supra note 53, 32 I.L.M. at 1528.
218. Ardi Imseis, Critical Reflections on the International Humanitarian Law Aspects of
the ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 102, 107 n.21 (2005).
219. Egypt's Perspective on the Legal Status of Gaza, EGYPT STATE INFO. SERV., http://
www.sis.gov.eg/en/Story.aspx?sid=3072 (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
220. See, e.g., Nidal al-Mughrabi, Hundreds Flee Hamas-Run Gaza amid Spillover
Fears, REUTERS (June 16, 2007), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOnel
idUSFLE45503220070616 ("Gaza and the ... West Bank ... now appear poised to function
as two separate territories.").
221. Shany, Faraway, So Close, supra note 190, at 372.
222. Oslo I, supra note 53, 32 I.L.M. at 1537; Oslo II, supra note 53, 36 I.L.M. at 568;
Wye River Memorandum, supra note 53, 37 I.L.M. at 1255 ("[N]either side shall initiate or
take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in accordance
with the Interim Agreement."); Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum, supra note 53, 38 I.L.M. at
1468 (using identical language as in the Wye River Memorandum, quoted above).
223. Stephanopoulos, supra note 185, at 526; Justus R. Weiner, Hard Facts Meet Soft
Law-The Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles and the Prospects for Peace: A Response to
Katherine W Meighan, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 931, 941 (1995).
224. Stephanopoulos, supra note 185, at 526.
225. Shany, Faraway, So Close, supra note 190, at 381; Shany, Binary Law, supra note
178, at 79.
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reply is that while the Oslo Accords are still in force,'26 termination of
occupation-as opposed to annexation by Israel or a Palestinian declara-
tion of independence-is not prohibited. Former legal adviser to the
Israeli Foreign Ministry, Alan Baker, opined that the disengagement plan
complied with the Oslo Accords, holding that the agreements included
Israeli obligations to redeploy that did not depend on Palestinian agree-
ment. Baker concluded: "I see this as a kind of redeployment, as far as it
can be implemented."227
Moreover, Israel has only limited potential to exercise effective con-
trol over the Gaza Strip. Arguably, retaking actual control over the Strip
would require a lengthy and costly military operation due to the expected
resistance by local organized forces. 228 This level of potential control is
presumably insufficient to establish occupation under the classic para-
digm. It appears to "fall short of the test for potential control laid down
by the U.S. Field Manual and the List and Naletilid cases, which requires
the occupier to have the capacity for exercising its authority over the ter-
ritory in question within a reasonable time."229
Finally, the existence of an organized Palestinian government that
exercises effective governmental powers in the Strip without significant
external intervention implies that the third condition for occupation is
also absent.230 In addition to governmental bodies, Hamas boasts tens of
thousands of security personnel in the Strip. Still, this level of control is
insufficient to establish independent statehood over the Gaza Strip.
C. Israeli (non-)Membership
Under the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt rule of customary in-
ternational law, also enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, treaties such as the Rome Statute generally do not bind or give
legal rights to non-parties.231' This is the case except as explicitly altered
226. See, e.g., Ruth Lapidoth, With the Israelis Gone, What is Gaza's New Legal Status?,
DAILY STAR, Aug. 24, 2005, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition-id=
I 0&categjid=5&articleid=17896.
227. Aluf Benn, Oslo Lives, HAARETZ, June 26 2005, available at http://
www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=472471 (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
228. Shany, Faraway, So Close, supra note 190, at 382; Shany, Binary Law, supra note
178, at 77.
229. Shany, The Law Applicable, supra note 216, at 5. See also Shany, Binary Law,
supra note 178, at 77.
230. This condition is the legitimate government's inability to exercise effective gov-
ernmental powers. Shany, The Law Applicable, supra note 216, at 5; Shany, Binary Law,
supra note 178, at 77.
231. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 126, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 341
(concerning third parties of a treaty). For further discussion see CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THIRD
PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1993) [hereinafter CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES]; C.M. Chin-
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by the parties with the consent of non-parties.232 Moreover, the Rome
Statute was amended to curtail its originally considered Universal Juris-
diction over non-party states.233 Instead, the statute "leaves out the
express language of 'universal' or 'inherent' jurisdiction, but 'preserves
some of the essence of universal jurisdiction,' namely that the ICC could
bind non-party states if 'one or more of' the states affected by the con-
duct in question was a party" within the state-based jurisdictional scope
of Article 12.23
Even prior to the adoption of the Vienna Convention, a judiciary
principle, known as the Monetary Gold doctrine had evolved in the
ICJ.235 The Monetary Gold case was part of a post World War H dispute
over 2,338 kilograms of gold seized by the Nazis from Rome in 1943.
After the war, in 1950, both Italy and Albania claimed ownership of the
gold before the joint French-UK-US Commission for the Restitution of
Monetary Gold. The failure of the Commission to resolve the matter was
then followed by an ICJ decision. The first issue to be addressed was the
legal dispute between Italy and Albania over the nationalization of the
National Bank of Albania. Consequently, as Albania had not deferred to
236
the ICJ in this case, the ICJ had no jurisdiction over the said matter.
The Monetary Gold doctrine suggests that a court should not de-
cide a case if doing so would involve adjudication of the rights and
responsibilities of a third party not before the court, and which had not
given its consent to the proceedings.' The Monetary Gold doctrine
kin, Third-Party Intervention Before the International Court of Justice, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 495
(1986) [hereinafter Chinkin, Intervention].
232. CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES, supra note 231; Chinkin, Intervention, supra note 231.
233. See U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
Int'l Criminal Court, Proposal Submitted by the United States of America, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/C.1/L.70 (July 14, 1998) (limiting the jurisdiction of the court to those situations
in which both the state in which the act or omission occurred and the accused state have ac-
cepted the court's jurisdiction); U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an Int'l Criminal Court, Proposal Submitted by the United States of America,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.90 (July 16, 1998) (limiting a court's jurisdiction to situations
in which the states in question have accepted jurisdiction, as well as any state whose accep-
tance is required under Article 7).
234. See Marcus R. Mumford, Building Upon a Foundation of Sand: A Commentary on
the International Criminal Court Treaty Conference, 8 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 151, 185 (1999)
(quoting the U.S. Delegation's Final Intervention at the International Criminal Court Confer-
ence, July 17, 1998). To be sure, this noticeably has been the American delegation's view.
235. Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr.), 1954 I.C.J. 19 (June
15). But see SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 431
(2d ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985) (offering of a narrow application of the doctrine to
where a third party's rights form the very subject matter of the dispute).
236. Monetary Gold, 1954 I.C.J. at 33, 41.
237. Id. at 33. The doctrine in fact is rooted in the Permanent Court of International
Justice (PCIJ). In the Eastern Carelia case the PCIJ declined to issue an advisory opinion on
the interpretation of a bilateral treaty in dispute between Finland and Russia over the status of
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presently applies to all international law tribunals. 238 Likewise, in 2001,
based on its analysis of the line of Monetary Gold cases, the Permanent
Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague in the Larsen case interpreted
those cases as setting forth a general international principle that "an in-
ternational tribunal cannot decide a dispute between the parties before it
if the very subject matter of the decision would be the rights or obliga-
tions of a State which is not a party to the proceedings."239
In the Monetary Gold case the ICJ concluded that it could not adju-
dicate the merits because the legal interests of Albania, the absent party,
"would form the very subject-matter of the decision."2 The Court as-
sumed that Albania had title to an adjudicated ownership of gold." A
similar assumption may be derived from the current context, namely that
the absent Israel may have legitimate claims about Palestinian violations
of the Oslo Accords, conflicting sovereignty over Palestinian territories,
and proportional use of the right to self-defense during the Israeli-Gaza
conflict, in light of the definition of segments of the Palestinian fighting
force as non-combatants.
In the Monetary Gold case, it did not seem pertinent to the Court
that it could have avoided prejudicing Albania's interests by simply lim-
iting itself to determining which of the two parties to the dispute before
the Court retained the superior claim. The ICJ rejected the United King-
dom's argument that Albania's absence should not be a barrier to
adjudication. It stated that Albania was free to request intervention, but
that if Albania refrained from joining the process, it would make the
ICJ's determination of its own jurisdiction dependent upon uncertain
East Karelia. The PCIJ ruled according to the doctrine, as Russia had refused to participate in
the proceedings and did not recognize the jurisdiction of the League or the Court. See Status
of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5 at 6 (July 23). The contem-
porary spelling of the name of the territory is Karelia.
238. The Kingdom of Hawaii recently appeared as a party at a proceeding before the
Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. Larsen v. Kingdom of Hawaii, 119 I.L.R. 566,
590-91 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2001). The Monetary Gold doctrine also was recently upheld in the
East Timor Case. See Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102-05
(June 30). The applicability of the other tribunals to the Rome Statute derives, mutatis mutan-
dis, from the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which stipulates "a treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, supra note 126, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340.
239. Larsen, 119 I.L.R. at 588. See also, David J. Bederman, International Decision:
Lance Paul Larsen v. The Hawaiian Kingdom, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 927,930-32 (2001).
240. Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr.), 1954 I.C.J. 19 (June
15). See also SHABTAI RoSENNE, INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
171-74, 190 (1993).
241. See Monetary Gold, 1954 I.C.J. 19. But see CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES, supra note
231, at 200 n.57 (questioning whether Italy may have had independent rights to the gold, not-
withstanding an arbitrator's prior finding in favor of the Albanian claim).
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events.242 In sum, the doctrine is applicable in cases where pronounce-
ment by the courts on the rights and responsibilities of a third state is a
necessary prerequisite for the determination of the case before the court
on either substantive or procedural law.
The nondiscretionary character of the Monetary Gold doctrine be-
came noticeably manifest in the Case Concerning East Timor.243 In that
case, for the first time since Monetary Gold, the ICJ declined to exercise
jurisdiction in the absence of a third party state because the absent state
had an interest in the determination of East Timor's statehood. 244 The ICJ
refused to rule on the validity of the Timor Gap Treaty between Australia
and Indonesia due to Indonesia's position as a third party that had not
consented to the jurisdiction of the Court.245 The Court held that it could
not exercise jurisdiction because in ruling on Portugal's claims, it would
have had to rule on the lawfulness of Indonesia's conduct in Indonesia's
absence. In fact, the Court paid no attention to concerns over the legal
nature of Indonesia's competing self-governing claim, based on theories
of occupation, annexation, or other means of competing self-governance.
The Court reached its decision despite the fact that Portugal maintained
that the right that Australia had breached, the right of self-determination,
was a right erga omnes.
The case of East Timor is of particular relevance to Israel's status
within the Palestinian statehood inquiry, in light of the principle of non-
intervention, embodied in Article 2(7) of United Nations Charter, and the
principle of self-determination. If East Timor is an Indonesian province,
as claimed by Indonesia, then the situation there is arguably not a matter
of international legal controversy and largely remains outside of United
Nations jurisdiction, given the non-intervention principle of Article 2(7)
of the U.N. Charter. 246 On the other hand, if the people of East Timor
have exercised their right to self-determination, then the principle of
non-intervention is inapplicable to the consideration of United Nations
action therein. If Indonesia's annexation of East Timor was illegal, as
was claimed by Portugal, then the territory remains a non-self-governing
territory of proper international concern under Chapter XI of the U.N.
Charter. Be that as it may, East Timor's status under international law
was ambiguous at the time of the relevant matter before the ICJ. Al-
though the Court had the opportunity to answer the question in East
242. See Monetary Gold, 1954 I.C.J. at 31-32.
243. See Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30).
244. Id. at 100-05.
245. Id.
246. See Gerry J. Simpson, Judging the East imor Dispute: Self-Determination at the
International Court of Justice, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 323, 337-38 (1994) (re-
ferring to the intricacies and possibilities facing East Timor).
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Timor, it justifiably refused to do so without Indonesia's joinder." In
this sense, the East Timor judgment, as it adheres to the Monetary Gold
doctrine, may challenge the OTP's position in assessing jurisdiction over
the Israel-Gaza war crime allegations, amidst a particularly complex Pal-
estinian statehood controversy.! The Palestinian matter remains at least
as controversial as the East Timor statehood consideration before the
ICJ.
Moreover, in a separate opinion in the East Timor case, Judge Sha-
habuddeen added that based on the implications of binding a non-party
to a controversial and complex case, Article 59 of the ICJ statute's plain
text should be read to stipulate that a non-party could never in subse-
quent litigation before the Court be bound by the results of a former
adjudication to which it was not a party.249 Israel, in that sense, in its con-
tinued capacity as a non-party to the Statute of Rome, might make a
similar analogy to former adjudication at the ICC over the Palestinian
status.
The Monetary Gold doctrine is not binary, but one of degree;25 0 how-
ever its degree seems to be subject to two competing interpretative
approaches. On the one hand, the narrow approach, analogous to that of
the preparatory work of the Statute of the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice, rejects the view that intervention should be allowed as a
general right, not only in disputes concerning the interpretation of a mul-
tilateral treaty to which the intervening state is a party.25' On the other
hand, a broader approach upheld by Judge Shahabuddeen in East Timor,
suggests that the concern underlying the Monetary Gold rule should not
and need not serve as a formal getaway that overly limits the Revised
247. Id.
248. See Dapo Akande, The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Na-
tionals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 618, 635-36 (2003)
(discussing ICC jurisdiction over non-parties); James A.R. Nafziger, Thomas J. Bodie's Poli-
tics and the Emergence of an Activist International Court of Justice, 20 LEGAL STUD. F. 129,
131 (1997) (book review) (discussing ICJ jurisdiction over non-parties).
249. See Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 119 (June 30)
(separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen) ("When [a] judgment would, in fact, even though
not in law, amount to a determination of the rights and obligations of a non-party, the Court is
being asked to exercise jurisdiction over a State without its consent. Monetary Gold Removed
from Rome in 1943 says it cannot do that.").
250. See Antonio F Perez, The Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro-Dialogic Ab-
stention by the International Court of Justice, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 399, 419 (1997).
251. See generally East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 119-228 (separate opinion of Judge Sha-
habuddeen); cf. Statute of the International Court of Justice (annexed to the Charter of the
United Nations, June 26, 1945) arts. 62, 63, 59 Stat. 1055, reprinted in CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, STATUTES AND RULES OF COURT AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL Docu-
MENTS (Series D, Acts and documents concerning the organization of the court, no. 1, 2d ed.
1947).
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2
52 Ac-
cordingly, every state has, to some extent, "an interest in the
development of international law by the Court, since the law the Court
develops may well affect particular legal interests of States in present or
future disputes."253
Where the ICC exercises jurisdiction over individuals acting pursu-
ant to the official policy of states, a prerequisite ruling must be made on
these states' contractual obligations, and their compliance with Interna-
tional Humanitarian law, whenever fundamental legal concerns are at
issue. For instance, the ICC would need to address the fundamental con-
cern of whether the Gaza Strip is still under Israeli military occupation
given Israel's unilateral disengagement from the Strip in relation to the
Palestinian statehood inquiry. In the wake of the recent Gaza conflict,
Israel's state responsibility might not necessarily flow from a tentative
accusation of crimes committed by its representatives, and thus a deter-
mination will have to be made regarding Israel's legal responsibility as a
prerequisite. As was decided in the Larsen/Hawaiian case, the findings
here will not merely be findings of fact. They may necessitate a legal
2514
assessment of Israel's conduct or legal position.
Lastly, in the future, "[d]epending on the definition of the crime of
aggression that is ultimately adopted,255 the ICC may, when it begins to
exercise jurisdiction over that crime, be required to find that a state has
committed aggression as a prerequisite to convicting an individual [rep-
resentative thereof] for [the same] crime. , Indeed, Article 16 of the
International Law Commission's 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against
Peace and Security of Mankind defines "crime of aggression" thus: "An
individual who, as leader or organizer, actively participates in or orders
the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of aggression committed
by a State shall be responsible for a crime of aggression."
257 Put differ-
ently, a violation by a state is a precondition for attributing the crime to
an individual. If the ICC makes the decision about state aggression,
252. See East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 119-22. See also Revised Rules of the Court, 1977
I.C.J. Acts & Docs. art. 69 ("[If] a public international organization sees fit to furnish, on its
own initiative, information relevant to a case before the Court, [it may do so.]").
253. Perez, supra note 250, at 419.
254. See Larsen v. Kingdom of Hawaii, 119 I.L.R. 566, 592 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2001).
255. Akande, supra note 248, at 637 (citing Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5(2))
("[T]he ICC will only be able to exercise jurisdiction with respect to aggression when a review
conference has defined the crime and adopts considerations relating to prosecution for that
crime.").
256. Id.
257. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 48th sess, May 6-July 26, 1996, U.N. Doc. A/
51/10; GAOR Supp. No. 10 (1996).
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"such a finding would constitute a violation of the Monetary Gold doc-
trine, where the state concerned is a non-party to the Rome Statute.
In the eleventh-hour, there remains the hypothetical future joinder by
Israel to the ICC within the time frame of the mentioned proceedings.
Joinder of third parties to disputes has been practiced occasionally. The
ICJ, for its part, has a record of maintaining a very cautious policy in
defining the legal interest required for interventions by third parties to
disputes before it.25 While its establishing statute allows third-party
states to intervene, the Court has allowed third-party intervention only
twice. In the first case, the 1990 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier
Dispute,2W the Court granted Nicaragua the right to intervene in a deci-
sion on the legal regime for the waters of the Gulf of Fonseca. In the
second case, the Land and Maritime Boundary case decided in 1999, the
Court permitted Equatorial Guinea to intervene in a boundary dispute
between Cameroon and Nigeria to protect its legal interest in the mari-
time boundary between the two.26' Even when the Court accepted the
joiner of parties, it applied a wide discretionary approach inquiring into
the "legal matter" at stake.262 In doing so, the Court quoted its opinion in
the Nicaragua Intervention case, upholding that whenever a third-party
state requests intervention "'to inform the Court of the nature of the le-
gal rights [of that state] which are in issue in the dispute,' it cannot be
said that this object is not a proper one."263 In such cases, ICJ experience
indeed is "to accord with the function of intervention."26 However, even
in the event that Israel will tentatively be allowed to join the proceedings
of the ICC, it probably will not do so, primarily so that it may continue
to insist on its present-day policy of not ratifying the
258. Akande, supra note 248, at 637
259. For an analysis of third-state remedies, see Jonathan I. Charney, Third State Reme-
dies in International Law, 10 MICH J. INT'L L. 57 (1989).
260. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), 1990 I.C.J. 92, 121-
22 (Sept. 13).
261. Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nig.), 1999 I.C.J. 1029 (Oct. 21).
262. See Land and Maritime Boundary, 1999 I.C.J. at 1034 (quoting Land, Island and
Maritime Frontier Dispute, 1990 I.C.J. at 130). But see, Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and
Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 2001 I.C.J. 575 (Oct. 23) (rejecting joinder request where
the Philippines claim of sovereignty over North Borneo conflicted with that of Malaysia and
the Philippines attempted to intervene in order to preserve their sovereign rights to the extent
that the question of sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan might affect them).
North Borneo is the area formerly known as the British North Borneo Co., and is presently
acknowledged as Sabah-an independent state of Malaysia. The Philippines uses the term
North Borneo, instead of Sabah, as its claim of sovereignty conflicts with that of Malaysia.
263. Land and Maritime Boundary, 1999 I.C.J. at 1034 (quoting Land, Island and Mari-
time Frontier Dispute, 1990 I.C.J. at 130). For a general discussion about the intervention by
Equatorial Guinea, see Malcolm D. Evans, Decisions of International Tribunals: The Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 49 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 720, 720-23 (2000).
264. Land and Maritime Boundary, 1999 I.C.J. at 1034.
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Statute of Rome, fearing the prospect of prosecution of Jewish settlers as
alleged war criminals.
A key determining factor for Israel's refusal to join is soundly based
on the international law principle governing "consent," as applied in the
Monetary Gold case. Under international law, an international tribunal
may not exercise jurisdiction over a state unless that state has given its
consent to the exercise of jurisdiction.266 This principle also applies to
cases before the ICC, according to Article 12.267 Reinforcing this position
was the Permanent Court of Arbitration's view that it operates within the
"general confines of public international law"
268 and, therefore, within
parameters similar to those of the ICJ. The latter also cannot exercise
jurisdiction over a state "which is not a party to the proceedings."
2
69 In
short, the tribunal unequivocally upheld that the principle of consent in
international law would itself be violated if the tribunal were to deter-
mine the legality of the conduct of a non-party, in that case the United
States.270
Similarly important, practice shows that even in the hypothetical
case in which the Palestinian Authority would request a joinder of Israel,
such joinder would possibly confront existing international law practice
upheld in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case. There, the Court was
asked by the United Kingdom to adjudicate a dispute with Iran. The Ira-
nians had seized the assets of a British oil company as they nationalized
the oil industry. 271 The ICJ ruled again that it could not exercise jurisdic-
tion without the consent of Iran.272
265. See, e.g., Daniel A. Blumenthal, The Politics of Justice: Why Israel Signed the In-
ternational Criminal Court Statute and What the Signature Means, 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 593 (2002).
266. See Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr.), 1954 I.C.J. 19 (June
15). This doctrine is in keeping with international principles of comity and dispute settlement.
267. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 12.
268. Larsen v. Kingdom of Hawaii, 119 I.L.R. 566, 590 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2001).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 591.
271. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93, 102 (July 22).
272. Id. at 103.
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III. CIRCUMVENTING THE Ex-ANTE STATEHOOD REQUIREMENT
A. The "Proprio Motu" Rule
1. The Normative Framework
With state parties, the prosecutor bears the authority to initiate pros-
ecutions proprio motu, without referral by a state party. if the
prosecutor argues that the Palestinian Authority, or even the Gaza Strip
alone, may qualify as a state, the 0TP may be faced with a novel situa-
tion. Article 15(4) sets a lenient standard of examination for the Pre-Trial
Chamber, whereby the Chamber may permit the commencement of in-
vestigations "without prejudice to subsequent determinations by the
Court with regard to ... jurisdiction," if "the case appears to fall within
the jurisdiction of the Court."27 4
The Prosecutor has said that in determining whether to exercise his
proprio motu powers, he is required to consider three factors, all of them
rooted in the ICC Statute. First, he must determine whether the available
information provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed." Second, he
must assess whether the case would be admissible in terms of Article 17
of the ICC Statute. 276 This second factor involves examination of the fa-
miliar standard of whether the national courts are unwilling or genuinely
unable to proceed; but it also involves an evaluation of the enigmatic
notion of "gravity," to be expanded upon below. 27 7 Third, if these condi-
tions are met, the prosecutor must then give consideration to the
"interests of justice."278 As recent ICC practice shows, these criteria, es-
pecially those of "gravity" and "interests of justice," provide much room,
albeit contentious, for discretionary determinations.279
273. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 13(c) & 15(3); Corrina Heyder, The U.N. Security
Council's Referral of the Crimes in Darfur to the International Criminal Court in Light of
US. Opposition to the Court: Implications for the International Criminal Court's Functions
and Status, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 650, 667 (2006).
274. Cf. Carsten Stahn, Mohamed M. El Zeidy & H6ctor Oldsolo, The International
Criminal Court's Ad Hoc Jurisdiction Revisited, 99 Am. J. INT'L L. 421, 425 (2005) (citing
John T. Holmes, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 325 (Roy S. Lee ed.,
2001)).
275. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 53(l)(a).
276. Id. art. 53(1)(b).
277. See infra Part m.A.3.
278. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 53(l)(c).
279. But see Matthew R. Brubacher, Prosecutorial Discretion Within the International
Criminal Court, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 71, 71 (2004); Luc C6t6, International Justice: ight-
ening up the Rules of the Game, 88 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 133 (2006).
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2. The Reasonableness of Criminal Proceedings
Theoretically, the prosecutor may commence an investigation even
before the putative Palestinian state lodges a declaration in accordance
with Article 12(3).280 In fact, the OTP may commence an investigation
into the crimes related to a putative Palestinian state, even if the ICC
21
might ultimately conclude that Palestine remains a non-state.
The Prosecutor's findings, assuming that he considers the allegations
merit continuing the process, might have far-reaching ramifications. Al-
though Israel is not a state party to the ICC, the Prosecutor would have
the power to demand that Israel try those responsible for any of the enu-
merated offenses. Additionally, if Israel were to ignore the OTP's
request, or decline to follow it, the ICC, the Palestinian Authority, and
numerous other states would have sufficient moral authority to propose
that member-states of the ICC, such as the United Kingdom or Canada,
arrest and charge Israeli "war criminals" under their domestic legislation
if they step onto the soil of those countries.
The ICC Prosecutor must conclude that there is a reasonable basis to
proceed with an investigation before submitting an investigation authori-
zation request to the Pre-Trial Chamber.282 However, the prosecutorial
structure established by the Rome Statute raises serious concerns in this
area. Under this particularly broad discretion, the prosecutor has the
power to initiate an investigation and prosecution completely on his own
authority and without oversight or control by any national or interna-
tional power, with the exception of limited review by the Pre-Trial
Chamber.283 This exception was designed to prevent the prosecutor from
being swayed by political concerns, but "experience in the United States
suggests that there is more to fear from a politically unaccountable pros-
ecutor than from a politically accountable one."a
3. The Dialectics of Gravity
The second criterion which the Prosecutor must assess under Article
17 of the Rome Statute involves the evaluation of the rather enigmatic
notion of the "gravity" of the alleged crime. Article 5 of the Rome Stat-
ute discusses the ICC's subject-matter jurisdiction. It provides that "[tihe
jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole."2 5 Article 17(1)(d) of
280. See Stahn et. al, supra note 274, at 425 n.33.
281. Id.
282. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 15(3) & 53(1).
283. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15.
284. Richard G. Wilkins, Ramifications of the International Criminal Court for War
Peace, and Social Change, CURRENT CONCERNs, no. 3, 2002 at 6.
285. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5(1).
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the Statute clarifies that the ICC shall rule a case inadmissible if it is not
"of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.""'
Although formal OTP policy considers a relativistic approach, ex-
perience points to only partial consistency in scaling gravity of crimes
thus far. The OTP "Prosecutorial Strategy," published in September
2006, provides that in selecting cases, "the Office adopted a policy of
focusing . .. on the most serious crimes and on those who bear the great-
est responsibility for these crimes."287 According to Schabas, "[t]his is
apparently combined with a so-called sequenced approach to selection,
whereby 'cases inside the [specific] situation are selected in accordance
with their gravity.' """ Any crime within ICC jurisdiction is serious, but
the Statute requires an additional consideration of gravity: the OTP
"must determine that a case is of sufficient gravity to justify further ac-
tion by the Court."289 According to the OTP, factors relevant in assessing
gravity include, inter alia, the scale, the nature, the manner of commis-
sion, and the impact of the crimes.2 *
Comparing the case of the Israel-Gaza conflict of 2008 with the case
of Iraq, it may appear that the Chief Prosecutor was overly careful in
exercising his responsibilities to ensure that an investigation was war-
ranted with regard to the latter. In his reply to over 240 communications
regarding suspected war crimes in the Iraq war, Chief Prosecutor Mo-
reno-Ocampo wrote a ten-page carefully considered letter explaining the
limits of his and the ICC's mandate. He then concluded that "the avail-
able information did not provide a reasonable basis to believe that a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court had been committed" with re-
gard to the targeting of civilians or clearly excessive attacks.2 9' His
analysis was based on the relative finding that the number of victims was
of a much smaller magnitude than the three situations his office was in-
vestigating in the Darfur region of Sudan, Uganda, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo. As a result, it "did not appear to meet the required
threshold of the Statute."2 92 A second relative finding was that alleged
286. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(d).
287. William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JusT. 731, 735 (2008) (quoting ICC, OTP, Report of
Prosecutorial Strategy (Sept. 14, 2006)).
288. Id. at 735-36.
289. Id. at 736.
290. See ICC, OTP, REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY 5-6 (Sept. 14,2006).
291. Letter from Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC, at 4-7 (Feb. 9,
2006), available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F596DO8D-D810-43A2-99BB-
B899B9C5BCD2/277422/1 OTP lettertosenders re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf.
292. Id. at 8-9. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 9(3) ("The Elements of Crimes
... shall be consistent with this Statute.") with arts. 7(l)(g) (providing a catchall for "any other
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity") and 17(1)(d) (limiting the Court's jurisdiction
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willful killing and inhuman treatment in Iraq were not "committed as
part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such
crimes" as required by Article 8(1) of the Rome Statute to meet the defi-
293
nition of war crimes.
A second warning about the use of the gravity test concerns the cy-
clical nature of the Israel-Gaza exchange of violence and relates to the
interests of peace and stability involved in ending cycles of violence.
294
Israel, as has been said, is not a state party to the Rome Statute establish-
ing the ICC. It cannot refer a situation to the Court arising from events
that occurred on its territory as part of the cycle of violence that revolved
around the Israel-Gaza conflict. 295 That is the case even if such events
may have explanatory power for Israel's continuous claims of self-
defense toward the Hamas organization in Gaza.
Within that rather limited geographical scope, were the Prosecutor to
commence a preliminary examination, and if thereafter an investigation
were to be initiated, he formally would not be obliged to look into any
crimes committed by the Palestinian side from a legal viewpoint. Of lit-
tle console within the perspective of Israeli public opinion is the fact that
although there were 326 plights for investigation, most, if not all, came
from the Palestinian side and carried a one-sided nature.
9 In arguing for
a cyclical, or at least comparative, evaluation of the events, Professor
Irwin Cotler-a former Canadian Minister of Justice, along with the
Human Rights Watch,2 97 and Amnesty International298-practically re-
mained a cry in the wilderness. Despite modest media coverage of that
account and noticeably few public supporters of Israel during the men-
tioned Operation, Professor Irwin Cotler concluded that there was
"almost no comparable example" anywhere in today's world of a group
such as Hamas that so systematically violates international law related to
to cases of sufficient gravity). Such a determination is within the jurisdictional discretion of
the Prosecutor. Id. art. 53(1)(c).
293. Letter from Luis Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 291, at 8 (citing the Rome Statute for
the International Criminal Court, supra note 1, art. 8).
294. Cf Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion
and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 583, 601-02 (2007) (ex-
plaining that international criminal tribunals increase the likelihood of punishment of political
actors, thereby deterring them from committing criminal acts).
295. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 13. Israel could hypothetically accept jurisdic-
tion over a specific alleged crime by lodging a declaration, id. art 12(3), or by seeking referral
from the Security Council, id. art. 13(b).
296. See supra note 11.
297. Letter from Sarah Leah Whitson, Executive Dir., Middle E. and N. Afr. Div.,
Human Rights Watch, to Leaders of Islamic Resistance Movement (Jan. 28, 2006), available
at http://www.hrw.orglen/news/2006/01/28lAetter-leaders-hamas.
298. AMNESTY INT'L, OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: TORN APART BY FACTIONAL
STRIFE (2008), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE21/020/2007/en/
6609e419-d363-11 dd-a329-2f46302a8cc6/mde2l0202007en.htmIl (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
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armed conflict.2 " In his view, there were at least six violations of interna-
tional law, namely the deliberate targeting of civilians by launching
rockets at towns in southern Israel for eight years; Hamas attacks from
within civilian areas and civilian structures; "the misuse and abuse of
humanitarian symbols for purposes of launching attacks," such as using
ambulances to transport fighters or weapons; direct and public incite-
ment to commit genocide within the Hamas covenant; the "crime against
humanity" manifested in the widespread and systematic attack against
civilian population; and the recruitment of children into armed conflict."*
Gravity assessment, as it seems, begs a proper comparative assess-
ment of events during any conflict, and the Israel-Gaza conflict in
particular, both internationally and among the parties involved in the par-
ticular cycle of violence.
4. Interests of Justice and Peace
A third criterion for the Prosecutor lies within the "interests of jus-
tice" in the case. Article 53 of the ICC Statute authorizes the Prosecutor
to decline to proceed with an investigation or a prosecution when it
would not be in "the interests of justice."' The expression was not in-
vented by the drafters of the ICC Statute; many legal systems use the
term or a similar formulation thereof. For instance, Article 14 of the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, use that exact term in assessing
whether to allow exceptions to the principle of a public trial, and when
to require funded counsel for a criminal defendant.302 Experience in the
ICC again shows wide discretionary usage of the term, specifically vis-A-
vis the United Nations' role and interest in peace and security, and peace
negotiations in particular.
The ICC drafters' contemplation of the peace-justice tension refers
to a "delicate balance between the search for international justice . .. and
the need for the maintenance of international peace and security," within
the United Nations Charter context.o3 In response to the latter concern,
299. Haviv Rettig Gur, Law professor: Hamas is a War Crimes 'Case Study',
JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 13, 2009, http://fr.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1231866576202&
pagename=JPArticle/ShowFull.
300. Id.
301. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 53.
302. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, adopted Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms art. 6, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European
Convention on Human Rights].
303. Roy S. Lee, The Rome Conference and Its Contributions to International Lw, in
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 1, 35 (Roy S.
Lee ed., 1999).
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ICC drafters balanced the discretionary power of the OTP by including a
provision allowing the Security Council to refer situations to the Court
and allowing the Security Council to defer an ICC investigation or
prosecution for a renewable 12-month period." But when it comes to
peace and security concerns not taken up by the Security Council, the
ICC Statute says very little. Michael Scharf, who discussed the matter
with Philippe Kirsch, the Chairman of the Rome Diplomatic Conference,
reported that according to Kirsch "the issue was not definitively resolved
during the Diplomatic Conference. Rather, the provisions that were
adopted reflect 'creative ambiguity' which could potentially allow the
prosecutor and the judges of the [ICC] to interpret the Rome Statute as
permitting recognition of an amnesty exception to the jurisdiction of the
court.,0o
Perhaps taking on a more literal approach, Chief Prosecutor Mo-
reno-Ocampo is said to argue that the OTP's role is not to functionalize
peace per se. As he has stated, "there is a difference between the con-
cepts of the interests of justice and the interests of peace and . . . the
latter falls within the mandate of institutions other than the Office of the
Prosecutor."3 6 In other words, he is said to take on the view that peace in
fact requires ICC adherence to the rule of law and justice, and also that
this was precisely the consensus of the Rome Conference when the in-
ternational community established the ICC.307 In tandem, Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International have in general held that the ICC must
push forward on the path to formal prosecution in the absence of ade-
quate national trials."
The United Nations seems to have thus far taken a more dichoto-
mous approach to peace-justice interests. First, the then-United Nations
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his opening remarks to the Rome Con-
ference, referred to the apprehension on the part of some "that the
pursuit of justice may sometimes interfere with the vital work of making
304. Id. at 35-36 (citing Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 13, 16).
305. Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 507, 521-22 (1999) (citations omitted).
306. ICC, OTP, THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 1 (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-4321-BFO9-73422BB23528/143640/ICCOTPInterests
OfJustice.pdf.
307. For Moreno-Ocampo's position, see Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC,
Building a Future on Peace and Justice, Address in Nuremberg (June 24-25, 2007).
308. Uganda: No Amnesty for Atrocities, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 27, 2006), http:l
www.hrw.org/ja/news/2006/07/28/uganda-no-amnesty-atrocities; Uganda Strikes Deal with
LRA on Trials, AMNESTY INT'L (Feb. 20, 2008), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-
updates/news/uganda-strikes-deal-Ira-trials-20080220.
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peace."'" Notwithstanding, the ICC Policy Paper on the Interests of Jus-
tice of 2007 further makes room for the view that the OTP must "respect
the mandates of those engaged in other areas.",o In distinguishing the
"interests of peace" from the "interests of justice," vis-A-vis the mandate
of the OTP, the Prosecutor already has been criticized for reading much
into the latter term.3 ' In the event that the Oslo peace process is ham-
pered due to single-sidedness vis-A-vis Israel, and there is not an ICC
member capable of suing Palestinian leaders at the ICC, one could argue
that this is not only contrary to peace but also contrary to justice.
Secondly, the dichotomous institutional approach was backed by the
United Nations, as well as Israel's peace promoting policies during the
ongoing Oslo peace process. The U.N. advanced or endorsed the grant-
ing of amnesty "as a means of restoring peace and democratic
government" with respect to four countries-Cambodia, El Salvador,
Haiti, and South Africa.312 Similarly, Israel on its end also has often pro-
vided amnesty during the Oslo peace process to hundreds of convicted
terrorists and criminal Palestinian prisoners, including life-sentenced
inmates said to have "blood on their hands.""'
Moreover, as Michael Scharf observed in his article on the paradox
of the ICC in balancing peace and justice, the U.S. delegation put forth a
suggestion at the 1997 preparatory conference for the establishment of a
permanent International Criminal Court that, "the proposed permanent
court should take into account such amnesties in the interest of interna-
tional peace and national reconciliation when deciding whether to
exercise jurisdiction over a situation or to prosecute a particular of-
fender."314 In advancing this proposal, the U.S. argued that "the policies
favoring prosecution of international offenders must be balanced against
the need to close 'a door on the conflict of a past era' and 'to encourage
the surrender or reincorporation of armed dissident groups,' and thereby
facilitate the transition to democracy.""' Concretely, during the Rome
309. Press Release, U.N., UN Secretary-General Declares Overriding Interest of Interna-
tional Criminal Court Conference Must Be That of Victims and World Community as a
Whole, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6597, L/2871 (June 15, 1998).
310. ICC, OTP, THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 306, at 8.
311. Schabas, supra note 287, at 749.
312. See Michael P. Scharf, The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal
Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 41 (1996).
313. Nadav Shragai, Releasing Terrorists: New Victims Pay the Price, 8 JERUSALEM
ISSUE BRIEFS, no. 8, 2008, available at http://www.jcpa.org/JCPAffemplates/ShowPage.asp?
DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=11l&FID-442&PID-0&IID=2498 (discussing Israeli Cabinet
approval on August 17, 2008 of the release of almost 200 Palestinian security prisoners as a
"goodwill gesture" to Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas).
314. Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 507, 508 (1999).
315. Id.
122 IVol. 32:73
Israel, Palestine, and the ICC
Statute negotiations, the United States and others "expressed concern
that the ICC could hamper efforts to halt human rights violations and to
restore peace and democracy in places like Haiti and South Africa."316
B. Security Council Referral
The United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter, may refer matters to the ICC, whether or not
the state involved is a party to the treaty ex-ante, or at all.' This was
done, for example, in the case of Darfur. Sudan is not a signatory state to
the ICC Charter and therefore the country would not normally be subject
to its jurisdiction. However, the situation in Darfur was referred to the
ICC Prosecutor by the United Nations Security Council in 2005. The
United States agreed that genocide was being committed in Darfur, and
like three other non-parties to the Rome Statute, abstained from voting
on the matter in the U.N. Security Council.1 Arguably, a Security Coun-
cil referral does not constitute violation of the Monetary Gold doctrine,
because the doctrine does not apply "if the legal finding against an ab-
sent third party could be taken as given (for example, by reason of an
authoritative decision of the Security Council on the point)."3 9 Put dif-
ferently, in the case of referral, the ICC will take the non-member state's
responsibility as given, without having to discuss it. Still, a Security
Council referral with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seems
unlikely, as any such resolution would almost certainly be vetoed by the
United States.
IV. BLOCKING PROSECUTION
A. The Complementarity Principle
The Preamble to the Rome Statute explicitly provides that the ICC is
"complementary to national criminal jurisdictions," and "is not intended
to supersede their jurisdiction. 3 20 "As such, the Court's jurisdiction will
316. See Michael Scharf, Justice Versus Peace, reprinted in THE UNITED STATES AND
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY 179 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl
Kaysen eds., 2000).
317. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 13(b).
318. See, e.g., Stephanie Hanson, Africa and the International Criminal Court,
July 24, 2008, htp://www.cfr.org/publication/12048/africa-andtheinternationalcriminal_
court.html.
319. Larsen v. Kingdom of Hawaii, 119 I.L.R. 566, 592 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2001).
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(2007), available at http://www.icclr.1aw.ubc.ca/Site Map/ICC/PoweroftheProsecutor.pdf.
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only be called into effect exceptionally, where national authorities are
unwilling or unable to hold genuine proceedings."3 21
Under Article 15(4), a majority of a panel of the Pre-Trial Chamber
must determine whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an
investigation, and whether the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction
of the Court before authorizing the ICC Prosecutor to commence the
investigation.322 The ICC Prosecutor must then "notify all States Parties
and those States which, taking into account the information available,
would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned."' A
state has one month to inform the ICC "that it is investigating or has in-
vestigated its nationals or others within its jurisdiction with respect to
criminal acts which may constitute crimes [within the ICC's jurisdiction]
and which relate to the information provided in the notification to
States," and to request that the ICC Prosecutor defer his investigation.3 24
"[T]he Prosecutor shall defer to the State's investigation of those persons
unless a majority of the seven judges on the Pre-Trial Chamber, on the
application of the Prosecutor, [nevertheless] decides to authorize the in-
vestigation," in which case the state concerned may appeal to the
Appeals Chamber on an expedited basis. 325 The state concerned may
again subsequently challenge the admissibility of the case before the
ICC will hear it.326 Finally, the U.N. Security Council, acting under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, may defer the investigation or prosecu-
tion of any case for renewable twelve-month periods.327 Unlike the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which have primacy over
domestic courts, the ICC turns primacy on its head by giving precedence
to domestic courts operating in good faith and genuine effort.328
Interestingly, in the aftermath of the Cast Lead Operation, the Israeli
military has ordered five cumulative inquires into allegations concerning
Israeli warfare in Gaza during Operation Cast Lead.' It remains to be
321. Id.
322. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15(4).
323. Id. art. 18(1).
324. Id. art. 18(2).
325. Id. arts. 18(2), 18(4), 82.
326. Id. arts. 19(2)(b) & 19(4). "The challenge shall take place prior to or at the com-
mencement of the trial. In exceptional circumstances, the Court may grant leave for a
challenge to be brought more than once or at a time later than the commencement of the trial."
Id. art. 19(4).
327. Id. art. 16.
328. Id. art. 17
329. Philip Willams, Israeli Military Orders Inquiry Into the Recent Gaza Conflict, The
World Today, AUSTR. BROAD. CORP. (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/
content/2008/s2521408.htm; Shimon Cohen, Shai: Five ongoing Investigations are
Conducted Following "Operation Cast Lead", ARUTZ SHEVA (Apr. 1, 2009), http:l
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seen how the OTP will deal with pro-Palestinian sentiment given possi-
ble Israeli legal findings of rather modest gravity, if at all.
B. Security Council Request for Deferral
Under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, the ICC Prosecutor may not
commence or proceed with an investigation or prosecution, if the Secu-
rity Council, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, has requested
a deferral.330 Such a deferral of an investigation or prosecution lasts for
12 months, but it may be renewed by the Security Council."' The likeli-
hood of using this mechanism in a highly politicized Security Council is
doubtful. While it was not accepted that the Security Council should
have general political control, it was conceded that there may be circum-
stances in which the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court would interfere
with the resolution of an ongoing conflict by the Council itself.32 In
those limited circumstances, the ICC parties have accepted that the Secu-
rity Council, acting under Chapter VH, may demand that the
requirements of peace and security are to take precedence over the im-
mediate demands of justice.3
Given that ICC parties have accepted obligations under the Statute
and non-parties, such as Israel, have not, it is more likely that the Secu-
rity Council will exercise its powers under Article 16 in relation to non-
parties.
CONCLUSION
A state-based system arguably was guaranteed within the Rome
Statute. This construction means that a Palestinian state must be in exis-
tence in order for the post-Israel-Gaza conflict proceedings to continue.
www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/187562 (noting that the five inquires include the attacks
against the International Red Cross compound, non-combatant civilians, house demolitions,
land stripping, and usage of white phosphorus ammunition).
330. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 16.
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332. See Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
93 AM. J. INT'L L. 22, 26-27 (1999).
333. See Dan Sarooshi, Aspects of the Relationship between the International Criminal
Court and the United Nations, 32 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 27, 38-39 (2001); Akande, supra note
248, at 646.
334. S.C. Res., 1422 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1442 (Nov. 25, 2002), renewed in S.C. Res.,
1487 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1487 (June 12, 2003) ("[The Security Council] Requests ... that the
ICC, if a case arises involving current or former officials or personnel from a contributing
State not a Party to the Rome Statute ... [shall] not commence or proceed with investigation
or prosecution of any such case, unless the Security Council decides otherwise."). See also
Carsten Stahn, The Ambiguities of Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002), 14 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 85, 85 (2003).
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This Article critically discussed several theoretical and practical argu-
ments for recognizing such a state, and concluded that these arguments
were not adequately persuasive.
One argument upholding Palestinian statehood under public inter-
national law was that a Palestinian state has existed since 1988, given
the Palestinian Declaration of Independence and its worldwide recogni-
tion. A second argument was that the statehood declared by the
Palestine National Council in 1988 was not of a new state, but of an
existing one. As explained above, these arguments fail to comply with
international law and historical events relating to Palestine, the United
Nations, and the international community at large. First, they are over-
ly subjective and therefore practically sub-standard vis-h-vis the
constitutive theory of state recognition. Second, the United Nations
acted inconsistently with its early recognition of Palestinian statehood.
Third, the constitutive-recognition theory is inconsistent in its applica-
tion to different Palestinian claims for statehood, as well as to
Palestinian acknowledgment of Palestine's pre-state status. Lastly, the
U.N. authority to endorse Palestinian statehood prior to 1988 was ques-
tionable.
The third argument analyzed was that Israel never claimed sover-
eignty over the occupied Palestinian territories, and as such its
sovereignty was not affected by the existence of a Palestinian state.
Based on the seminal work of Crawford, this Article suggested that state
independence embodies two indispensable elements, one of which,
namely lack of competing title for sovereignty, is absent in our case, giv-
en Israel's ongoing title dispute over most Palestinian territories.
The fourth argument was that Israel itself recognized the Palestinian
state. As recognition is an act undertaken by states, if Israel did not re-
gard Palestine as a state, there would be no point in asking for a
Palestinian recognition of Israel as a pretext to the Oslo Accords. As was
explained, since the crucial state actors here are the United States and
Israel, which vehemently do not recognize Palestine as a state, the con-
stitutive theory runs contradictory to contractual undertakings by both
Palestinians and Israelis, backed by Quartet members, namely the United
States, the European Union, the Russian Federation, and the United Na-
tions.
The fifth argument was that Israel's recognition was tacitly in com-
pliance with the customary rule whereby state recognition need not be
expressed in a formal document. A cautious reading of both informal and
formal Palestinian leadership statements of the last sixty years, however,
indicate a systematic Palestinian insistence on not declaring and estab-
126 [Vol. 32:73
Israel, Palestine, and the ICC
lishing a Palestinian state as long as peace talks with Israel have not ter-
minated.
A distinct question may arise with regard to a separate Palestinian
state in the Gaza Strip. Several problems exist here in light of state-
recognition theoretical aspects, in particular the declaratory state-
recognition criterion of the ability to govern the Strip.
Finally, there remains a question of whether Palestinian statehood
could be upheld by the OTP, given Israel's possible adherence to the In-
dispensable Third Party Doctrine, as has been systematically practiced
by the ICJ. The doctrine specifically entails the inadmissibility of legal
processes in the absence of relevant third parties when their absence is
vital to a substantive legal matter at hand. Israel may be regarded as
holding competing title for Palestinian territories in a sense that conflicts
with the latter's claim for sole sovereignty. Within the doctrine, there
remains the hypothetical question concerning the possible future joinder
of Israel to the Rome Statute. In particular, there is value, albeit specula-
tive, in considering the implications of Israel's reluctance to join the ICC
and the parallel scenario in which the Palestinian Authority would uni-
laterally act to join Israel. On both accounts it was argued in this Article
that the power to act against Israel was legally questionable.
In exercising his proprio motu powers under the Rome Statute, the
Prosecutor is required to consider whether the national courts are unwill-
ing or unable genuinely to proceed. In doing so, ICC practice entails
further evaluation of the somewhat enigmatic notion of crime "gravity"
and the "interests of justice." These criteria provide, as recent ICC prac-
tice shows, a great deal of room, albeit contentious, for discretionary
determinations.
In the wake of the tragic Israel-Gaza 2008-09 armed conflict and
recently commenced process at the ICC, the Court will need to carefully
consider all of the reservations presented here, in the process of
maintaining both justice and peace for Israel and the future state of
Palestine.
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